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Two studies were conducted to investigate how the use of different types of 
language affects attitudes. Participants scrutinized arguments supporting a hypothetical 
toothpaste that differed in terms of argument strength (strong versus weak) and linguistic 
abstractness (abstract versus concrete) and subsequently evaluated the toothpaste. In 
addition, half of the participants in the second study were subjected to a cognitive load 
manipulation (i.e., rehearsing a ten-digit number) in order to limit their level of cognitive 
elaboration. Results indicated that strong arguments and those containing concrete 
descriptions led to more positive attitudes about the toothpaste, whereas weak messages 
comprised of abstract terms gave rise to the least favorable evaluations. These findings 
represent the first demonstration of the effect of language type on attitudes and suggest that 
  x
future research into the functions of differential linguistic abstractness in a persuasive 
context will broaden our understanding of attitude change.     
   
  1 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
 From television ads to political campaigns, movies to classroom lectures, 
persuasion is an integral part of life in the twenty-first century. Many different techniques 
are employed effectively in our consumer culture to convince us of the merits, superiority, 
and “rightness” of a barrage of products and personalities. With or without our knowledge, 
we are continually confronted with messages and images that are manufactured to try to 
make us change our minds. Many seemingly routine decisions, such as how best to save 
for retirement, how to interact with people from different backgrounds, and whom to elect 
as president, have far-reaching consequences for the individual and for society as a whole. 
Given the gravity and scope of the ramifications of such decisions, it is important to 
examine how elements of persuasive messages and contexts strengthen and change our 
attitudes. The current research examined the use of one such component, language, as a 
persuasive tool. Specifically, the effect of abstract versus concrete language on persuasion 
was tested to determine how making seemingly subtle changes in the generality or 
specificity of a persuasive message influenced attitudes toward the argument’s topic. 
Persuasion  
 The topic of persuasion and attitude change has a strong and rich history within the 
field of social psychology. Inspired by World War II and the charge to understand enemy 
propaganda, Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelley formed the Yale 
Communication Research Program in the 1940s and 1950s. The chief contribution from 
this camp of researchers was the identification of four different components of a persuasive 
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communication and how each functions to induce attitude change (Hovland, Janis, & 
Kelley, 1953).   
 One class of stimuli within a communicative context that can bring about attitude 
change is the observable characteristics of the message’s perceived source. Hovland and 
Weiss (1951) examined the impact of source credibility on persuasion. Participants were 
presented with identical messages, but the source of the particular message was 
manipulated. Half of the participants were informed that the messages they read had come 
from a highly credible source, such as the Journal of Biology and Medicine; the other half 
were led to believe that the message originated from a low credibility source, such as a 
mass circulation magazine. Hovland and Weiss (1951) found that participants in the high 
credibility condition perceived the messages as fairer, more justified, and more persuasive 
than did those who had encountered a low credibility source. The researchers concluded 
that individuals’ reactions to a communication are heavily influenced by cues to a source’s 
expertise, intentions, and general trustworthiness.    
 A second set of features impacting the persuasiveness of a given message is the 
characteristics of the receiver of the communication. Personality variables can impact 
one’s ability or motivation to evaluate a message and, thus, affect its perceived 
persuasiveness. Janis (1954) conducted a study in an effort to uncover dispositional 
elements correlated with susceptibility to persuasion. Participants’ initial opinions 
regarding several topics (e.g., the future of movie theaters) were assessed. A few weeks 
later, the participants were presented with and asked to orally summarize three persuasive 
communications regarding the previous subject matter. They were then asked to rerate 
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their attitudes toward the topics. Janis (1954) found that attitude change in the direction of 
the positions espoused in the messages differed among participants. After obtaining 
personality data for each subject, Janis observed marked differences in disposition between 
those who were high versus low in persuasibility. Specifically, participants who were 
highly susceptible to persuasion tended to be more passive, more socially inadequate, and 
to have lower self-esteem than did those who were more resistant to the persuasive 
messages. Janis (1954) concluded that certain personality characteristics might pre-dispose 
individuals to change their opinions more readily in response to a persuasive 
communication. 
 In addition to source and recipient variables, elements of persuasive messages 
themselves play a role in determining their effectiveness. Several aspects of persuasive 
arguments, or appeals, work by arousing motives to accept a message’s position. One such 
appeal, examined by Janis and Feshbach (1953), concerns fear or emotional tension. 
Students at a Connecticut high school were exposed to one of three communications about 
dental hygiene and tooth decay. The messages differed only in terms of the amount of 
“threat material” they contained. The strong appeal focused primarily on the painful 
consequences of tooth decay and gum disease; the moderate appeal outlined the hazards of 
poor dental care in a milder, more factual manner; and the minimal appeal made very little 
mention of the unpleasant consequences of tooth neglect. Janis and Feshbach (1953) found 
that the three appeals differed in the amount of emotional tension they evoked. Students 
exposed to the strong appeal felt more worried about their teeth and gums than did those in 
the moderate appeal group, who in turn tended to worry more than subjects in the minimal 
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appeal condition. Taken together, these results provided evidence that the features of a 
message that is increasingly threatening tend to induce greater emotional arousal and 
subsequent attitude change. 
 Finally, the context in which an individual encounters a message can either 
augment or minimize its persuasiveness. Situational factors, such as the presence of others, 
the presence or absence of counterarguments, and even message ordering can lead to 
differences in attitude change. Kelley (1955) examined the impact of the situational factor 
of group salience on resistance to counternorm communications (messages that run counter 
to a group’s norms). Catholic high school and college students were given one of two short 
readings, one that described various aspects of the Roman Catholic Church (high salience) 
or one that contained neutral material (low salience). All subjects then completed a 
questionnaire containing items regarding censorship of books, parental control, and 
religious traditionalism. Two-thirds of participants also received a communication 
ostensibly made by “the typical student” that took positions fairly divergent from those 
acceptable to most Catholics. Kelley (1955) found greater resistance to this counternorm 
communication among Catholics for whom their religious affiliation had been made salient 
than among those who read the neutral material. In this way, group salience decreased the 
persuasiveness of a message that ran counter to group norms.   
 Hovland and his colleagues at Yale made a significant contribution to our 
understanding of attitude change by identifying several variables of critical importance in 
determining the persuasiveness of a given communication. However, the specific processes 
by which these factors fostered attitude change remained unknown and largely unexplored. 
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One of the first and most widely accepted explanations regarding when and how various 
elements of a persuasive context elicit attitude change was offered by Petty and Cacioppo. 
In the 1980s, these researchers incorporated Hovland and colleagues’ work into a model of 
persuasion called the Elaboration Likelihood Model, or ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 
1986). The ELM specifies the means by which source, message, recipient, and contextual 
variables impact attitudes and introduces a dual process model of cognition whereby 
attitudes can be formed and changed. The model posits that cognitive processing and 
subsequent attitude change may occur via one of two routes: central route processing or 
peripheral route processing.   
 Central route processing occurs when message-related thinking mediates the 
relationship between persuasive communication and attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). The individual forms favorable or unfavorable thoughts about the message by 
actively evaluating it and by drawing upon prior experience and knowledge. In order for 
central route processing to occur, the individual must be motivated and able to put forth 
cognitive effort in scrutinizing the argument. Attitudes resulting from central route 
processing are typically persistent, predictive of behavior, and resistant to change (Petty, 
1995).   
 Peripheral route processing is characterized by a minimal amount or complete lack 
of mediating cognitive responses between message and persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). If a person is unwilling or unable to thoroughly process the argument at hand, then 
he or she relies on relatively simple cues in the persuasive message or situation that either 
become directly associated with the position of the message or allow inferences regarding 
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its validity to be made. Peripheral route processing usually results in more ephemeral 
attitudes than does central processing (Petty, 1995). That is, they typically do not persist as 
long, are not as predictive of an individual’s actions, and are more susceptible to change 
than are attitudes formed via central route processing. 
 The degree to which individuals think about issue-relevant arguments is referred to 
as elaboration, which can vary widely across situations and individuals for a number of 
reasons. Two primary determinants of elaboration are motivation and ability to put forth 
cognitive effort in a particular context. According to the first postulate of the ELM (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986), people are motivated to, or desire to, hold correct attitudes. In a 
given situation, the greater the importance of holding a correct attitude, the greater the 
cognitive resources an individual is willing to expend to evaluate the issue at hand. 
Variables that affect one’s motivation to process information include personal relevance 
(i.e., does the topic at hand directly concern or affect me?), anxiety, and familiarity with 
the attitude object. Elaboration also depends upon an individual’s ability to put forth 
cognitive effort. Factors affecting one’s ability to process issue-relevant arguments include 
distraction, repetition, time pressure, and message comprehensibility. Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986) also point out that both motivation and ability must be present in order for a person 
to thoroughly evaluate a persuasive message. If one is highly motivated but not able to put 
forth cognitive effort in processing a message, then he or she will rely on simple cues when 
evaluating the communication. Similarly, if an individual is capable of expending energy 
to deeply scrutinize a persuasive message but lacks sufficient motivation to do so, then any 
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evaluation of the communication is likely to be made on the basis of cursory peripheral 
cues.  
 The level of elaboration under which one is operating in a given situation 
determines the route (central or peripheral) by which persuasion will occur (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Under conditions of high elaboration, an individual is willing and able to 
deeply process and scrutinize a given argument. Message-related processing occurs, 
mediating the link between message and persuasion, and the resulting attitude change is 
said to have occurred via central route processing. Under conditions of low elaboration, 
however, motivation and/or ability are minimal, and the individual does not attend 
carefully to the information presented. Instead, he or she processes the argument shallowly, 
relying on peripheral route processing to evaluate the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).   
 According to the ELM, there are three main ways in which the components of a 
persuasive communication (i.e., source, recipient, message, and context) can interact with 
cognitive processing and influence attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). First, a given 
factor may function as an element of the persuasive argument itself. For example, the most 
extensively researched component of a persuasive communication is argument quality, 
specifically argument strength. Strong arguments are composed of logically defensible 
points and provide statistical or other sound evidence to support the claims that are made 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986); as a result, they elicit primarily favorable thoughts about the 
argument’s espoused position (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In contrast, weak arguments 
employ unsubstantiated quotations, weakly supported opinions, and other specious devices 
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that lead to primarily unfavorable thoughts about the argument’s position (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986).   
 A commonly employed means of manipulating argument strength is outlined in 
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1979) studies on issue-involvement in a persuasive context. 
Participants were presented with one of two counterattitudinal messages supporting the 
institution of comprehensive examinations for seniors prior to graduation. One version of 
the message, labeled the “strong” condition, contained eight arguments that were 
compelling and logically defensible, employing statistics and data to support the claims 
made. The strong message contained arguments such as the implementation of exams at 
other schools has led to (a) improved teaching, (b) increased financial support from state 
legislatures, (c) higher starting salaries for graduates, and (d) higher scores on standardized 
tests such as the GRE. In contrast, the weak message contained eight arguments that were 
more open to refutation and relied on quotations and opinions for support. Examples of the 
weak arguments included (a) senior exams are in keeping with a long-standing tradition 
dating back to the ancient Greeks; (b) since graduate students have to take comprehensive 
exams, they feel that undergraduates should have to take them, too; (c) parents supported 
the implementation of senior exams, and (d) comprehensive exams would essentially scare 
students into studying (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).   
 In addition to the argument strength manipulation, issue-involvement was also 
manipulated. Issue-involvement refers to the degree to which the matter presented in a 
persuasive message has direct implications for the recipient. High-involvement implies that 
the issue is personally relevant for the message recipient, while low-involvement recipients 
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do not feel that the message topic is personally relevant to them. Issue-involvement and 
personal relevance impact how motivated an individual will be to put forth cognitive effort 
in evaluating the message. Higher levels of involvement and personal relevance increase 
the likelihood that an individual will analyze a message. Thus, this differential motivation 
determines the level of elaboration (high or low) at which the persuasive message is 
scrutinized.   
 To manipulate issue-involvement, half of the participants were told that 
comprehensive exams would be instituted at their school, the University of Missouri (high-
involvement condition). The other half were led to believe that the change would be 
initiated at North Carolina State University (low-involvement condition). In analyzing the 
data, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found an interaction between involvement and argument 
strength. Among those who were under the impression that comprehensive exams would 
be implemented at their school (high-involvement), strong arguments generated more 
favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments than did weak arguments. In contrast, no 
effect for argument strength was found in the low-involvement condition. For participants 
who believed that exams would be instituted at North Carolina State University, attitudes 
toward and number of counterarguments generated against the strong and weak messages 
did not differ significantly. Taken together, these results support the researchers’ 
contention that argument strength or quality is a highly influential factor when the 
persuasive message is encountered under conditions of high elaboration. 
 The second way in which a component of a communication can impact persuasion 
is by serving as a peripheral cue, or a trivial characteristic of the persuasive message or 
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context (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Peripheral cues do not affect argument scrutiny; instead, 
they elicit affective responses or the use of heuristics. In instances in which cognitive 
responses do not mediate the argument-persuasion relationship, individuals rely on 
peripheral route processing and are swayed by factors such as message length or overheard 
reactions. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) demonstrated the effect of a peripheral cue (number 
of arguments) on persuasion under conditions of low elaboration and resulting peripheral 
route processing. The experiment was similar in design to the previously described study 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Participants were presented with either strong or weak 
arguments in favor of senior comprehensive exams that would be instituted at the 
participants’ university (high-involvement) or at a different university (low-involvement). 
The researchers also manipulated the number of arguments presented to the participants. 
Participants were presented with either three or nine arguments advocating the initiation of 
senior comprehensive examinations.  
 Among participants in the high-involvement (high elaboration) condition, strong 
arguments induced more attitude change than did weak arguments, regardless of the 
number of arguments presented; this finding supports the notion that argument quality has 
a large impact on persuasion when people are willing and able to engage in message-
related thinking (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). When issue-involvement and elaboration were 
low, however, messages containing nine arguments were viewed as more persuasive than 
those with three, regardless of the quality of the arguments themselves. That is, the number 
of arguments was more persuasive than the quality of the arguments for participants in the 
low elaboration condition. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) concluded that those in the low 
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elaboration condition relied on peripheral route processing and were thus susceptible to the 
influence of a peripheral cue (number of arguments).   
 Finally, the third way a communication factor can affect persuasion is by 
influencing an individual’s level of elaboration. Manipulating one’s motivation and ability 
to elaborate will influence the processing route and affect the success of a persuasive 
message. As detailed earlier, central route cues such as argument strength are highly 
influential under conditions of high elaboration, while peripheral cues including the 
number of arguments hold more sway when elaboration is low (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Any variable that increases or decreases one’s level of elaboration has a degree of power 
over the type of processing in which an individual engages (central or peripheral) and over 
the type of cues that will be most persuasive to him or her. Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez (1986) investigated the effect of one such variable, need for cognition (NFC), 
on persuasion. NFC is a stable individual difference in people’s tendencies to engage in 
and to enjoy effortful cognitive processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The researchers 
presented participants who were high or low in NFC with either eight strong or eight weak 
arguments advocating for tuition increases at their school. Post-communication attitudes 
toward the proposed tuition hikes were assessed via five 9-point semantic differential 
scales (agree/disagree, good/bad, beneficial/harmful, wise/foolish, favorable/unfavorable). 
In addition, participants evaluated the messages using five 9-point scales, such as “To what 
extent do you feel the message arguments presented in the audiotape were convincing?” (1 
= not at all convincing, 9 = very convincing). Cacioppo et al. (1986) found an argument 
quality by NFC interaction such that those participants who were high in NFC listed 
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significantly more favorable thoughts and reported more positive post-communication 
attitudes about the strong arguments and more unfavorable thoughts about the weak 
arguments than did low NFC participants. While an effect for argument quality was found 
among participants low in NFC, it was not as strong as that found among high NFC 
individuals. The researchers concluded that people high in NFC are more motivated to 
process deeply and engage in more issue-relevant thinking. That is, they operate at a higher 
level of elaboration than do those who are low in NFC.   
 The ELM nicely outlines a dual-processing model of attitude change and provides 
the means by which persuasive communication factors may influence evaluations. Indeed, 
the impact of many specific factors (e.g., argument strength, NFC) has been tested using 
this model. However, one aspect of a persuasive communication that has received little to 
no attention is the actual language used within the message. Within the past decade, a few 
lines of research have begun to narrow their focus from the traditionally studied factors to 
more nuanced features of a message’s presentation in an attempt to understand how 
message framing can affect people’s evaluations and judgments.  
Persuasion and Language 
 Lavine and colleagues (1999) examined the effect of message framing and political 
ideology on persuasion. To do this, they presented participants with a message promoting 
voting behavior (an ideologically neutral topic) and manipulated how the message was 
framed. For half of the participants, the appeal was framed in terms of the benefits or 
rewards of voting (e.g., “Voting allows one to be heard.”). For the other half of the 
participants, the appeal was framed in terms of the loss or threats associated with not 
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voting (e.g., “Voting prevents your values from being undermined.”). Participants who 
were more politically conservative rated the threat framed message as more persuasive and 
believed the message to be more valid than the benefit framed message. More politically 
liberal participants found the reward framed message to be more persuasive and valid. 
These results suggest that the same persuasive message, communicated in slightly different 
ways, can lead to disparate attitudes toward the argument’s subject matter. 
 More recently, Cesario, Grant, and Higgins (2004) have examined the effect of 
message framing and regulatory fit on persuasion. According to Higgins (2000), regulatory 
fit occurs when an individual’s orientation toward a given activity (i.e., approach, 
avoidance) matches the manner in which he or she pursues that particular goal. When 
regulatory fit occurs, individuals have the subjective experience of “feeling right.” In a 
persuasive context, this pleasant subjective experience may be used as evidence in 
determining how convincing the message is. Cesario et al. (2004) predicted that framing 
messages in ways that either matched or mismatched the orientation style in which an 
essay was presented would impact the arguments’ perceived persuasiveness. To test this, 
the researchers presented subjects with a message concerning the importance of eating 
fruits and vegetables that had either a promotion orientation (e.g., “A diet rich in fruits and 
vegetables results in increased energy levels”) or a prevention orientation (e.g., “A diet rich 
in fruits and vegetables buffers against stress”). Within each communication, the means of 
achieving the goal of increasing fruit and vegetable intake was framed in terms of either 
gains (e.g., “If you eat more fruits and vegetables, then you will obtain overall good 
health”) or losses (e.g., “If you do not eat more fruits and vegetables, then you cannot 
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actively facilitate good health”). Cesario et al. (2004) found that regulatory fit between 
orientation and means increased a message’s persuasiveness. Those who read the 
promotion essay and the gains-framed means of achieving the goal found the message to 
be more convincing than did those who were exposed to the promotion orientation 
message with loss-framed means. Among the prevention orientation group, those messages 
containing loss terms were rated as more persuasive than arguments framed in terms of 
gains. While the messages conveyed essentially the same information, the specific 
linguistic choices made in each led to differential persuasiveness ratings. Thus, it seems 
that subtle linguistic differences can influence the overall effectiveness of a persuasive 
communication.   
 Beyond this recent work investigating message framing and political ideology or 
regulatory fit, very little research within the persuasion literature has examined how 
subtleties such as the type of language used to express a message can affect attitudes. The 
previous findings (Cesario et al., 2004; Lavine et al., 1999) indicate that message 
presentation and language use can be powerful determinants of a communication’s 
persuasiveness and suggest that direct investigations of such nuances could improve our 
understanding of attitude change.   
Linguistic Abstractness 
 Empirical pursuits independent of attitude change research have investigated the 
effects of language on evaluation and provide a conceptual framework for integrating the 
subtleties of language into the persuasion literature. One rich line of research within the 
psycholinguistic tradition has focused exclusively on the relationships between differential 
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language use and judgments of targets. Developed by Semin and Fiedler (1988), the 
linguistic category model, or LCM, is primarily focused on the psychological properties 
that underlie interpersonal language. Because social psychological processes occur in a 
communicative context, language is best viewed as a social tool or the product of social 
interaction. Key to the LCM’s psychological underpinnings is the notion that a particular 
message can be conveyed in multiple ways. The type of linguistic tools selected to 
communicate an idea to another person reveals a great deal about the transmitter’s goals 
and the likely psychological impact on the message recipient (Coenen, Hedebouw, & 
Semin, 2006).   
 At the heart of the LCM is the tenet that an individual’s behavior can be described 
and encoded at four different levels of abstractness, ranging from narrow (concrete) to 
broad (abstract) (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Concrete terms serve a primarily descriptive 
function and leave little to the imagination, while abstract terms are more general, 
ambiguous, and invite the message recipient to draw his or her own conclusions.    
 Consider the following scenario: You are sitting in a park when you happen to 
notice a boy (Johnny) shove a girl (Jenny). A concerned mother comes running and asks 
you if you saw what happened. How will you describe what you have witnessed? 
According to Semin and Fiedler (1988), the words used to answer the mother’s question 
have a great deal of power over the impression she forms of the incident and of the two 
children involved. As such, choosing one level of language abstractness over another to 
describe a situation has implications for the perceived cause and durability of the observed 
behavior.   
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 In the LCM, descriptive action verbs, or DAVs, are most concrete. Such verbs 
simply describe the situation at hand, without inviting the reader to infer anything about 
the initiator of the action. The statement Johnny pushes Jenny lays out the behavior 
observed but reveals nothing about how the pushing might have come about, how typical 
the pushing is, or other underlying features of the observed action. DAVs are also defined 
by the fact that they refer to a physically invariant feature (Coenen et al., 2006). When 
presented with the verb “to kick,” one can be sure that there is always a foot involved; 
similar relationships between verb and object exist with “to push” (hands), “to walk” 
(legs), and “to kiss” (mouth). Finally, DAVs are neutral terms that derive an evaluative 
nature from the context surrounding them. “To push” can be viewed as a positive or 
negative action, depending upon context (Pushing someone out of the way of a bus is a 
good thing; pushing someone in front of a bus is not).   
 Interpretive action verbs, or IAVs, also describe the event, but differ from DAVs in 
that they refer to a general class of behaviors, not to the specific action at hand. This lack 
of a physically invariant feature allows the individual to draw a few conclusions about the 
initiator that extend beyond the given situation. If told that Johnny hurts Jenny, one must 
infer exactly how Johnny hurt poor Jenny, as well as why he might have done such a thing. 
Also, unlike DAVs, IAVs carry an evaluative component in and of themselves. Regardless 
of contextual variation, “to hurt” is pejorative, just as “to help” elicits positive sentiments.  
 At the third level of abstractness are state verbs (SVs), which speak to the actor’s 
cognitive or affective state and any changes therein. The observed action is no longer 
presented as situationally caused or bounded, but as a result of something about the actor 
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him- or herself. In the statement Johnny hates Jenny, no mention is made of the specific 
action; instead, Johnny’s hatred says a lot more about him than his pushing (DAV) did. 
Maybe he has had bad run-ins with Jenny in the past. Perhaps he is having a bad day. 
Maybe he is an angry little boy. The use of an SV invites a person to make assumptions 
about the state and stability of Johnny’s demeanor that the use of more concrete terms does 
not. In addition, because SVs refer directly to internal states, they carry with them strong 
evaluative components. Indeed, SVs speak almost entirely to the negativity or positivity of 
the actor’s nature or emotional state. “To hate” clearly carries a negative connotation from 
which the message recipient can infer many behavioral manifestations of the hatred. 
 Adjectives (ADJs) comprise the most abstract category in the original LCM. ADJs 
invite the receiver of the communication to generalize across situations and objects of the 
action and speak to the features of the actor alone. If the concerned mother is told that 
Johnny is aggressive, the statement refers entirely to the initiator of the action, implying 
that the target of his aggression could have been anyone, that he is likely to behave 
aggressively in other venues and with other children, and that this aggression will likely 
manifest in a particular set of behaviors, such as pushing, kicking, biting, and screaming. 
The use of an ADJ in describing an individual and his or her actions incurs the greatest 
degree of evaluation about him or her. With no other interaction or context provided in the 
description, the recipient draws on the ADJ, be it positive (“helpful”) or negative 
(“aggressive”), as the only reference point in evaluating the actor. 
 In recent years, two more linguistic categories have been identified. First, there has 
been a push to expand the LCM to include a “nominatives” or nouns category (Anolli, 
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Zurloni, & Riva, 2006). Social stereotypes such as “fascist,” “nerd,” and “housewife” are 
commonly found in persuasive communications such as political speeches (Anolli et al., 
2006) and are, in many cases, even more abstract than adjectives. Because the use of a 
noun actually labels someone as belonging to a particular category (Johnny is a bully) as 
opposed to implying something about what he or she is like (Johnny is aggressive), there is 
greater likelihood of inferences being made regarding the target. Category labels imply that 
the individual possesses all of the descriptive features with which the term is commonly 
associated. In addition, nominative labels such as social stereotypes often activate strong 
affective responses (Anolli et al., 2006).  
 Finally, Coenen et al. (2006) have identified state action verbs, or SAVs. These 
terms refer to the emotional consequences of an action, such as “to amaze” and “to 
surprise.” In practice, however, SAVs do not differ significantly from IAVs in terms of 
abstractness level (Coenen et al., 2006) and so are typically not distinguished from IAVs. 
 In their seminal work in the area of differential linguistic abstractness, Semin and 
Fiedler (1988) examined how different linguistic categories function in descriptions of 
people and their actions. The aim of the first study conducted was to determine whether a 
unidimensional classification (concrete to abstract) was an appropriate means of 
delineating the four linguistic categories that the researchers had uncovered (DAVs, IAVs, 
SVs, and ADJs). Students from the University of Sussex in England were presented with 
thirty-six minimal sentences containing stimulus terms that had been randomly selected 
from the linguistic categories. Participants answered five follow-up questions for each 
sentence that focused on the item’s (a) subject informativeness, (b) enduringness, (c) 
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verifiability, (d) disputability, and (e) situative informativeness. Semin and Fiedler (1988) 
found that the linguistic categories can be appropriately described as situated in a linear 
order along a single, concreteness-abstractness continuum. These findings indicated that, 
as one moves from DAVs to IAVs to SVs and finally to ADJs, “subject informativeness 
increases, situative informativeness decreases, and the sentence appears more endurable, 
less verifiable, and more likely to be the object of disagreement or dispute” (p.563).   
 Building upon the foundations laid in Study 1, the researchers set out to investigate 
how differential linguistic abstractness is employed in describing particular persons and 
situations. Participants in Study 2 were given a pictorial representation of one of three 
target persons (an extrovert, an introvert, or a Machiavellian) acting in one of three 
situations (seminar, party, or business deal). Subjects then rated the likelihood that the 
target person would manifest each of 30 behaviors (10 DAVs, 10 IAVs, and 10 SVs) and 
10 ADJs in the given situation on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) “not at all” to (7) “very 
frequently.” Semin and Fiedler (1988) found that the importance of the target person’s 
characteristics to the judgments of behavioral frequency increased linearly from DAVs to 
ADJs, while there was a monotonic decline in sensitivity to situational elements over the 
same linguistic span. When encountering behavioral descriptions containing DAVs, there 
was a tendency among participants to place more emphasis on situational factors than 
personal characteristics in predicting the frequency of the behavior.  When reading 
descriptions containing more abstract terms (e.g., ADJs), participants placed less emphasis 
on the situation and focused more on the target’s features and disposition in making 
behavioral frequency judgments. These findings indicate that the more abstract the term 
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employed to describe a person or behavior, the less difference context makes and the more 
important the individual’s characteristics become in judging the target.    
Linguistic Abstractness and Evaluation 
 According to Semin and Fielder (1992), the process of differential abstractness 
outlined in the LCM contributes to both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. 
Thus, negative attributions for out-group behavior and positive attributions for in-group 
behavior should be described more abstractly, while more concrete terms should be 
employed when making negative attributions for in-group behavior and positive attribution 
for out-group behavior. In order to test this, Fiedler, Semin, and Finkenauer (1993) 
conducted a study in which men and women were asked to write freely about both their 
gender in-group and gender out-group. In general, in-group descriptions were more 
favorable than were descriptions of the out-group, which contained greater numbers of 
SAVs and ADJs. Interestingly, the researchers also found greater uniformity among 
descriptions in the out-group condition, indicating that people often rely on consistent or 
even stereotypical language when interpreting the actions of members of an out-group. 
 Building upon the foundation laid by Semin and Fiedler (1988, 1992), Maass and 
colleagues sought to further explain the link between differential abstractness and 
stereotype perpetuation. Proposed by Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989), the 
Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) applies the processes outlined in the LCM to intergroup 
processes in an attempt to explain how stereotypical beliefs are transmitted and 
maintained. In line with the findings of Semin and Fiedler (1988; 1992), the LIB predicts 
that desirable in-group behaviors and undesirable out-group behaviors will be 
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communicated abstractly and that undesirable in-group actions and desirable out-group 
action will be conveyed concretely.   
 The critical contribution of the LIB is that this bias in behavioral interpretation is 
due to differential expectancies. In general, people expect members of their in-group to 
behave positively more often than negatively, while undesirable behaviors are expected to 
outweigh desirable ones when considering out-group members (Howard & Rothbart, 
1980). When an individual behaves in a way that confirms these pre-existing expectations, 
we are more likely to draw inferences about the individual from the specific action. By 
interpreting congruent behaviors abstractly, people extrapolate to find a fit between the 
behavior, the individual, and their pre-conceived notions of how “we” or “they” typically 
behave and are. If John, an in-group member, holds the door for us, we are likely to 
describe John’s action abstractly, see the behavior as indicative of John’s good nature, and 
confirm our expectation of in-group members behaving positively. The same door-holding 
behavior initiated by Ted, an out-group member, is likely to be described concretely, to be 
viewed as not indicative of his true nature, and therefore to not hold enough weight to 
change our attitudes about out-group members behaving negatively. 
 When presented with behaviors that run counter to one’s expectations, the LIB 
proposes that individuals attempt to reconcile the episode as an exception to the rule. Thus, 
when our in-group member John slams a door in our face, we tend to interpret the action 
concretely, ascribing causality more to the situation than to John’s disposition, and viewing 
it as not indicative of how John – or others like us – typically behave. In this way, John’s 
action is dissociated from his intent or disposition, is excused as atypical, and poses no real 
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threat to our thoughts about in-group superiority in general. If out-group member Ted 
slams a door, however, the tendency is to view the event as due to his unpleasant 
disposition and to assume that he generally behaves in other negative ways, regardless of 
the situation or interaction in which he finds himself.   
 This tendency to interpret congruent behaviors more abstractly than incongruent 
ones offers a possible means by which biases are preserved, even in light of evidence to the 
contrary. According to the LIB, our pre-existing beliefs about members of our in-group 
and out-groups lead to differential abstraction such that congruent behaviors are viewed as 
more indicative of how that individual (and group) typically behaves, and incongruent 
actions are dismissed as anomalies. In both instances, the pre-existing expectations are 
maintained, either by confirming evidence or by evidence that is not viewed as compelling 
enough to warrant changing our beliefs. Maass et al. (1989) have proposed that this 
process is cyclical in nature, explaining how something as seemingly subtle as language 
might contribute to the perpetuation of group stereotypes. 
 In order to test the validity of their theory, Maass et al. (1989) conducted a study of 
in-group and out-group expectations and language use in the town of Ferrara in Italy. The 
setting and timeframe corresponded with the build-up to an annual horse-race or palio in 
which people from different quarters of the city competed against one another; this ensured 
high levels of in-group identification and out-group devaluation. Participants were 
presented with cartoons depicting either expectation-congruent behaviors or expectation-
incongruent behaviors and were asked how best to describe the images. Maass et al. (1989) 
found that members of various contrada (teams) made description choices that supported 
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the LIB. When reviewing a cartoon that depicted desirable in-group or undesirable out-
group behaviors, individuals tended to select descriptions containing SVs and SAVs (more 
abstract); individuals opted for more concrete descriptions containing DAVs and IAVs 
when presented with undesirable in-group or desirable out-group behaviors. These findings 
were obtained when participants were asked to provide free responses and when asked to 
select from four set responses. In addition, the results were duplicated when in-group and 
out-group distinctions were based on place of residence (village A versus village B) and 
not groups that were in direct competition (Maass & Arcuri, 1992).   
 In considering these findings, Hamilton, Gibbons, Stroessner, and Sherman (1992) 
suggested that interpreting positive out-group behaviors and negative out-group behaviors 
narrowly restricts implications for overall group evaluation. By interpreting behavior 
concretely, the observer constrains an out-group member’s desirable actions to the context 
at hand, the general perception of the out-group is preserved, and many stereotypical 
beliefs about the out-group’s relative inferiority remain intact. Also, positivity toward the 
in-group is maintained because the negative behavior is restricted to a specific situation. 
 From these studies, it is evident that the use of abstract versus concrete language 
can affect one’s evaluations and judgments of a particular target. As the work surrounding 
the LIB demonstrates, differential linguistic abstractness is used to strengthen and 
perpetuate positive evaluations of in-group members and negative evaluations of out-group 
members. These biases are based upon summary evaluations of, or attitudes toward, a 
target individual or group. Work by Maass and others provides compelling evidence that 
employing concrete versus abstract language in describing a target has definitive 
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implications for the attitudes surrounding it. The current research extends this notion by 
more directly investigating how language abstractness functions in a persuasive context. 
By manipulating both argument strength and language abstractness, the following studies 
explored the role that language type plays in the alteration of attitudes.  
Present Studies 
 The primary focus of the current studies was to expand upon the existing body of 
literature regarding persuasion. More specifically, the research attempted to integrate two 
rich bodies of research within social psychology in an effort to better understand the 
mechanisms at work in persuasive communication. While the ELM and work surrounding 
it has laid a solid foundation for understanding the ways in which many factors in a 
persuasive message influence attitude change, little work has directly investigated the role 
that a message’s specific wording may play in this process. As work by Cesario et al. 
(2004) and Lavine et al. (1999) has demonstrated, even subtle alterations in word choice 
and tone can lead individuals to find messages differentially persuasive. Indeed, the LCM 
and linguistic intergroup bias research also indicates the impact that language can have on 
attitudes. Linguistic abstractness affects evaluations and attitudes toward individuals and 
groups. Thus, it seems plausible that the degree of linguistic abstractness used to convey an 
idea could have significant implications for the type and amount of attitude change 
induced. The current studies integrated the ELM and LCM in an effort to uncover the 
means by which abstract versus concrete language may convey different information about 
the general message.   
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 The current studies employed a standard, ELM-style procedure to manipulate both 
argument strength and language abstractness. As in research by Petty, Cacioppo, and 
others, arguments supporting a topic (in this case, a hypothetical toothpaste called Razzle-
Dazzle) were presented. In study 1, half of the arguments were strong, containing 
compelling and logically sound points; the other half were weak, comprised of less 
defensible items. Within these two conditions, language abstractness was also varied, such 
that half of the strong and half of the weak arguments employed abstract (ADJs and SVs) 
terms and the remaining arguments contained concrete (IAVs and DAVs) terms. Study 2 
employed the same argument strength and language abstractness manipulations; in 
addition, elaboration level was manipulated. Half of the participants were engaged in a 
cognitive task (rehearsing a ten-digit number) while reading the arguments for Razzle-
Dazzle and comprised the low elaboration condition. The other half of the participants 
were not subjected to the cognitive busyness task and evaluated the arguments without 
distraction; they constituted the high elaboration condition. In both studies, participants 
read the arguments and then provided their attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle, as well as 
completed several additional questionnaires.   
Hypotheses 
 Drawing upon the postulates laid out by Petty and Cacioppo in the ELM (1984, 
1986), it was hypothesized that a main effect for argument strength would be obtained. 
That is, under conditions of high elaboration, strong arguments were expected to generate 
more positive attitudes and to be viewed as more effective and convincing than were weak 
arguments. Numerous studies have found this pattern of results when manipulating 
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argument strength (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1984; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 
1981; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). It was predicted that participants exposed to strong 
arguments, containing logically defensible and compelling points, would find them to be 
more persuasive than would those who were exposed to weak arguments composed of less 
objective, more refutable points.   
 With regard to the manipulation of language abstractness, the current studies were 
exploratory in nature. As this was the first time that the effect of linguistic abstractness on 
persuasion was examined, it remained to be seen how this manipulation would directly 
impact individuals’ attitudes or interact with argument strength. Also of note is the fact that 
the LCM has thus far been confined to the study of descriptions of people and their actions. 
Work by Semin and Fiedler (1988, 1992) and colleagues has made a strong case for the 
existence of four distinct linguistic categories based upon concreteness versus abstractness. 
Maass and her colleagues (1989) have expanded upon this founding work to explore the 
implications of linguistic abstractness for intergroup relations, stereotyping, and the 
formation and perpetuation of intergroup biases. In each instance, however, differential 
linguistic abstractness has been employed or evaluated in terms of human actors and their 
behaviors. Until now, the LCM has not been extended into the realm of descriptions of 
non-human objects. In the current studies, concrete versus abstract language was employed 
in both strong and weak arguments supporting a hypothetical toothpaste called “Razzle-
Dazzle.” While the hypotheses surrounding argument strength were based on a solid 
grounding in the large body of research surrounding the ELM, the effect of language 
  27
abstractness on the persuasiveness of a message supporting an inanimate object remained 
an open question.   
 The second study included an additional independent variable, elaboration. Work 
by Petty and Cacioppo (1979) and others (Petty et al., 1981) has demonstrated that (a) 
elaboration level can be manipulated experimentally and that (b) the level of elaboration at 
which a persuasive communication is processed influences the effectiveness of strong 
versus weak arguments. By controlling an individual’s motivation and/or ability to put 
forth cognitive effort in evaluating an argument, researchers can control whether 
participants operate at either a high or low level of elaboration. In the second study, a 
cognitive load manipulation was employed to limit subjects’ ability to devote cognitive 
resources to the thorough scrutiny of the arguments presented. In keeping with past 
findings, an argument strength by elaboration interaction was hypothesized. It was 
predicted that participants in the high elaboration condition (no cognitive load) would rate 
strong arguments as more persuasive than weak arguments. For those in the low 
elaboration condition (participants subjected to cognitive load), it was expected that no 
significant difference in persuasion would be found between strong and weak arguments.  
 As with the first study, linguistic abstractness was also manipulated. The direct 
impact of abstract versus concrete language on persuasion, as well as any potential 
interactions with argument strength and with elaboration level, remained an open empirical 
question.  
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CHAPTER 2 Study 1 
 
 The first study examined the impact of both argument strength and language 
abstractness on attitudes toward the hypothetical toothpaste “Razzle-Dazzle.” The study 
employed a 2 argument type (strong, weak) X 2 language type (abstract, concrete) 
between-subjects design, giving rise to four experimental conditions: strong/abstract 
argument, strong/concrete argument, weak/abstract argument, and weak/concrete 
argument. Based upon the ELM, it was hypothesized that strong arguments would be more 
persuasive than weak arguments. Research by Petty, Cacioppo, and colleagues (1979, 
1984, 1986) has demonstrated that strong arguments containing logically defensible points 
induce more attitude change than do weak arguments comprised of less sound reasoning. 
Therefore, it was predicted that participants exposed to strong arguments for Razzle-
Dazzle toothpaste would rate the product more positively and would report being more 
likely to purchase the toothpaste and recommend it to others than would those who 
encountered weak arguments. In addition, strong arguments were expected to be rated as 
more convincing than were weak arguments. 
 While a main effect for argument strength was predicted, the nature of the effect of 
language abstractness on persuasion remained to be seen. As this experiment represented 
the first instance in which the impact of employing concrete versus abstract terms in a 
persuasive context on attitudes toward a novel, inanimate product was explored, no 
specific predictions regarding a direct effect on attitudes or a potential interaction with 
argument strength were advanced. 
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Method 
Participants 
 One hundred fifty-seven undergraduate students (70 women) enrolled in 
psychology courses at Virginia Commonwealth University participated in the study for one 
hour of research credit. There were no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, or 
religious affiliation. The only requirements for participation were a minimum age of 
eighteen and fluency in English, as participants needed to be able to carefully read and 
evaluate a written argument. The number of participants randomly assigned to each of the 
four conditions was as follows: Thirty-eight in the strong-abstract (SA) condition, forty-
one in the strong-concrete (SC) condition, forty-two in the weak-abstract (WA) condition, 
and thirty-six in the weak-concrete (WC) condition.¹   
Measures 
 The independent variables included in study 1 were argument type and language 
type. Argument type was manipulated by presenting participants with either strong or weak 
arguments in favor of Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste. Language type was manipulated by 
employing either abstract (ADJs and SVs) or concrete (IAVs and DAVs) terms in the 
arguments. Ten potential arguments corresponding to each condition (forty total) were 
_________________________ 
 1. Analyses were also run using an equal number of participants in each of the four 
conditions. To do this, randomly chosen participants were excluded until each condition 
had a sample size of thirty-six (the number of participants in the smallest condition, WC). 
This produced an adjusted sample size of one hundred forty-four. Analyses conducted on 
this adjusted sample yielded the same pattern of results as obtained from the full sample, 
so analyses using the full sample are reported. 
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developed (see Appendix A). To ensure that the argument strength and language  
abstractness manipulations were effective, a pilot study was conducted. All 40 arguments 
were presented to volunteers (n=11) in a random order. For instance, four statements 
regarding the toothpaste’s plaque-fighting ability were included, differing only in terms of 
strength and abstractness. The four versions of this argument were: “Razzle-Dazzle is a 
great plaque fighter” (SA), “Razzle-Dazzle reduces plaque by up to 45%” (SC), “Razzle-
Dazzle is a reasonably good plaque fighter” (WA), and “Razzle-Dazzle reduces plaque by 
up to 5%” (WC). Participants were then asked to rate each argument on four scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very) in regards to the strength (e.g., “how convincing is this 
argument?”, “how strong is this argument?”) and abstractness (e.g., “how specific is this 
argument?”, “how open to interpretation is this argument?”) of the message. Analyses of 
the pilot data indicated that the strength and abstractness manipulations were successful. A 
2 (strength) X 2 (abstractness) repeated measures ANOVA on raters’ evaluations of 
argument strength was conducted. There was a significant main effect of manipulated 
argument strength, F(1, 10)=45.85, p<.001, partial η2=.82. Participants rated the strong 
arguments (M = 3.34, SD=1.13) about Razzle-Dazzle as stronger than the weak arguments 
(M = 2.31, SD=.90). A 2 (strength) X 2 (abstractness) repeated measures ANOVA on 
raters’ evaluations of argument abstractness was also conducted. There was a significant 
main effect for language abstractness, F(1,10)=21.06, p<.001, partial η2=.68, such that 
items containing abstract terms (M =3.86, SD=.83) were rated as more abstract than those 
comprised of concrete terms (M = 3.29, SD=.88).  
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 Attitude Measures. Participants’ attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste were 
assessed using several measures (see Appendix B). Participants rated Razzle-Dazzle on 
five semantic differential scales, ranging from -4 to +4, with the following endpoints: (a) 
like/dislike, (b) good/bad, (c) negative/positive, (d) favorable/unfavorable, and (e) 
against/in favor. Also, participants were asked to provide a rating of their likelihood of 
trying, purchasing, and recommending Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste based upon the arguments 
presented. All five attitude items and the three behavioral questions were highly correlated 
(rs from .75 to .95) and demonstrated very strong internal reliability (α=.98). As such, 
these eight items were averaged to create a composite dependent variable assessing 
attitudes toward and behavioral intentions regarding the hypothetical toothpaste, Razzle-
Dazzle
.
2
  
 Need for Cognition Scale. In addition to assessing participants’ attitudes, 
individuals’ need for cognition (NFC) was measured. As outlined by Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986) and demonstrated empirically by Cacioppo et al. (1986), people who routinely 
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive processing (high NFC) are more motivated to 
process deeply and thus operate at a higher level of elaboration than low need for cognition 
individuals. In order to gauge this individual difference variable, all participants completed 
Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) 18-item need for cognition scale (see Appendix C). This scale 
has good internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .84) and includes items such as “I find  
_______________________ 
 2. Analyses were also run on the individual attitude and behavior items, which 
yielded the same pattern of results obtained for the composite dependent measure. 
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satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours” (item 6) and “I prefer my life to be 
filled with puzzles that I must solve” (item 13). Individuals are instructed to indicate how 
characteristic of themselves each item is on a scale ranging from 1 “very uncharacteristic” 
to 5 “very characteristic.” After reverse-scoring the necessary items, the NFC scale 
demonstrated sufficient inter-item reliability (α=.69). The average of these eighteen items 
was computed to create a composite NFC score. 
 Importance of Dental Hygiene Questionnaire. As work by Petty and Cacioppo 
(1979) and Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) has demonstrated, the degree of personal 
relevance that a particular topic has for an individual affects his or her motivation to 
cognitively elaborate on arguments surrounding it. In the current study, it was important to 
assess how much participants cared about their overall dental health and hygiene in order 
to determine how relevant arguments supporting a brand of toothpaste would be. The 
importance of oral care may moderate the effect of the argument manipulations on 
participants’ attitudes toward the hypothetical toothpaste product, Razzle-Dazzle, and the 
likelihood that they would purchase or recommend the toothpaste. To assess this potential 
motivational factor, an “importance of dental hygiene” questionnaire was created and 
distributed to participants (see Appendix D). The survey was intended to measure the 
importance of dental hygiene and the frequency of dental health care behaviors (i.e., 
brushing teeth and visiting the dentist). The importance item (e.g., “how important is 
dental hygiene to you?”) was followed by a seven-point response scale ranging from -3 
(not important) to 3 (very important). The frequency items (i.e., “how often do you brush 
your teeth?” and “how often do you go to the dentist?”) were presented in a free-response 
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format. Participants’ responses for these items were subsequently reviewed and coded. For 
the frequency of brushing question, responses were assigned a numerical value 
corresponding to the number of times per day the participant indicated brushing his or her 
teeth (e.g., “twice per day” = 2). Responses lower than once per day were assigned a value 
of zero. Similarly, the dentist visit item was coded based upon how many times per year 
the participant reported going to the dentist (e.g., “twice per year” = 2). A value of zero 
was assigned to any responses indicating dentist visits occurring less than once per year. 
Higher values on these frequency items were taken as indication of a participant placing 
greater importance on dental hygiene. The number of times people brushed their teeth per 
day was found to correlate positively with self-reports of the importance of dental hygiene 
(r=.26, p<.01), and a composite variable was created from these two items (α=.68). 
Frequency of dental visits did not correlate significantly with either frequency of brushing 
or self-reports of the importance of dental hygiene and was not included in the composite 
IDH variable. 
 Demographics Questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a demographics 
questionnaire (see Appendix E) assessing age, sex, marital status, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, and hometown size. 
Procedure   
 Upon arrival at the lab, participants were seated at individual cubicles and were 
informed that they would be taking part in a study about how people go about making 
choices regarding the products they buy. Participants were informed of the confidentiality 
and anonymity of the study and asked to sign an informed consent form. Each participant 
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was instructed to read and carefully consider arguments supporting the hypothetical 
toothpaste Razzle-Dazzle. Participants were given a sheet of paper containing one of four 
versions of the arguments corresponding to the experimental conditions. Participants were 
told to thoroughly read the statements on the sheet they were given and to respond to 
several follow-up measures presented via MediaLab research software (Jarvis, 2000). 
These measures were a) the attitude measures, b) the Need for Cognition scale, c) the 
Importance of Dental Hygiene questionnaire, and d) the demographics questionnaire. 
Throughout these assessments, participants retained the argument sheet and were 
encouraged to refer back to the statements in responding to the questions presented. 
Participants were then debriefed, any questions they raised were answered, and they were 
dismissed.    
Results 
 Before proceeding with tests of the study’s hypotheses, it was necessary to ensure 
that the data met all assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance. All 
variables of interest were found to meet these assumptions, making it appropriate to run 
analyses on the data in its original form without transformation, deletion, or other 
manipulation. In addition, conditions did not differ in terms of the motivational factors 
(i.e., NFC and IDH) or any of the demographic variables.3 
_______________________ 
 3. Attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle did differ by sex , F(1, 150)=7.02, p=.01, partial 
η
2
=.05, such that women evaluated Razzle-Dazzle more positively (M=6.31, SD=2.02) 
than did men (M=5.27, SD=2.04). However, sex did not co-vary with strength, 
abstractness, or need for cognition. The sex difference appeared to be driven by differential 
motivation, such that women rated dental hygiene as significantly more important  
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Manipulation Checks 
 In order to ensure that the strength and abstractness manipulations were successful, 
two questions assessing perceived strength and one regarding abstractness were included in 
the follow-up measures. For both strength items (“How strong is this argument?” and 
“How convincing is this argument?”), responses could range from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very), 
with higher numbers indicating stronger or more convincing arguments. As these items 
were highly correlated (r=.85), they were averaged to create a composite variable assessing 
perceived strength. A one-way ANOVA assessing the effect of manipulated argument 
strength on perceived strength revealed that the strength manipulation was highly effective, 
F(1, 142)=29.82, p<.001, partial η2=.17. Strong arguments were rated as significantly 
stronger (M=7.26, SD=.27) than were weak arguments (M=5.16, SD=.27). 
 A similar manipulation check was incorporated to assess the effectiveness of 
creating arguments of differential abstractness. The item (“How specific is this 
argument?”) was embedded in the follow-up questionnaires; responses ranged from 1 
(specific) to 9 (general), such that larger numbers indicated greater perceived abstractness 
whereas smaller values corresponded to more concrete arguments. A one-way ANOVA 
assessing the impact of assigned abstractness on perceived generality/specificity of the 
arguments was conducted. Although the overall trend indicated that abstract arguments 
were rated as slightly more general (M=6.15, SD=.30) than were concrete statements  
________________________ 
(M=6.59, SD=.95) than did men (M=6.06, SD=.95), F(1,155)=12.01, p=.001, partial 
η
2
=.07.   
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(M=5.64, SD.30), this difference did not reach statistical significance, F(1,142)=1.50,  
p=.22, partial η2=.01. To verify that the abstractness manipulation was effective as found 
in the initial pilot study, a revised pilot study was run. Volunteers (n=30) rated the 40 
arguments in terms of a) openness to interpretation, b) clarity, c) generality, d) specificity, 
and e) vagueness. The results of this revised pilot indicated that the abstractness 
manipulation was effective, F(1,21)=5.06, p=.035, partial η2=.19, such that abstract 
arguments were rated as more general, vague, and open to interpretation (M=3.56, SD=.57) 
than were concrete arguments (M=3.30, SD=.59). In light of these findings, as well as the 
support provided by the significant effect for abstractness in the original pilot study, the 
failure to obtain significant results in the manipulation check was most likely due to the 
use of a single item lacking in sensitivity.    
Tests of Main Hypotheses 
 The main purpose of the current experiment was to test the effects of argument 
strength and language abstractness on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle. However, as 
previous ELM research has highlighted the importance of motivational factors in 
determining attitude change, it was possible that need for cognition (NFC) and/or 
importance of dental hygiene could significantly affect attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle. In 
order to examine both main and interactive effects of the independent measures on 
evaluations of the hypothetical toothpaste, the potential motivating factors were controlled 
in the original analyses. Thus, a 2 (strength) X 2 (abstractness) between subjects analysis 
of covariance was conducted with NFC and IDH entered as covariates. The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for strength, F(1,150)=51.89, p<.001, partial η2=.26, 
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such that participants who read strong arguments about Razzle-Dazzle evaluated the 
toothpaste significantly more positively (M=6.90, SD=2.82) than did those who read weak 
arguments (M=4.58, SD=2.85). This supported the initial hypothesis that strong arguments 
would lead to more positive attitudes about the target than would weak arguments. There 
was also a main effect of abstractness on evaluations of the toothpaste, F(1,150)=32.40, 
p<.001, partial η²=.18. Specifically, arguments containing concrete language were 
associated with significantly more positive attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (M=6.66, 
SD=2.89) than were those comprised of abstract descriptions (M=4.81, SD=2.83). 
 Finally, the main effects were qualified by a significant strength X abstractness 
interaction, F(1,150)=4.94, p=.03, partial η2=.03. Tukey post-hoc tests were conducted to 
determine which combinations of strength and abstractness differed significantly in terms 
of attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle. The pattern of means is depicted in Figure 1. The most 
striking finding was that participants in the weak-abstract (WA) condition evaluated the 
toothpaste significantly less favorably (M=3.25, SD=2.06) than did participants in the 
weak-concrete (WC; M=5.96, SD=2.37), strong-abstract (SA; M=6.29, SD=1.98), and 
strong-concrete (M=7.46, SD=1.86) conditions, all ps < .05. The WC, SA, and SC 
conditions did not differ significantly, ps>.06. 
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Figure 1 The interactive effect of argument strength and linguistic abstractness on attitudes 
toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 1). 
 
Tests of Motivational Factors 
 In order to determine if either of the motivational factors (i.e., NFC or IDH) 
significantly affected attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle or moderated the effects of the 
independent variables, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted predicting attitudes 
toward Razzle-Dazzle. First, in accordance with Aiken and West (1991), both NFC and  
IDH were centered to reduce collinearity. Also, both strength and abstractness were 
dummy coded (0 = “weak,” 1 = “strong”; 0 = “concrete,” 1 = “abstract,” respectively). In 
the first step, the three main effects were entered (i.e., NFC, strength, and abstractness). 
The two-way interactions were entered in the second step (i.e., strength X abstractness, 
strength X NFC, and abstractness X NFC). The three-way interaction among strength, 
abstractness, and NFC was entered into the third step. The results of this regression 
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analysis are presented in Table 1. The first model predicted significant unique variance in 
evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle; however, these effects were driven by the significant main 
effects of strength and abstractness. The only other significant effect found was for the 
interaction of strength and abstractness. The additional variance accounted for by the 
addition of the three-way interaction was not significant. In sum, no interactions containing 
NFC emerged as significant predictors of toothpaste attitudes. 
Table 1  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Need for Cognition as a Predictor of 
Attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 1) 
Variable     B      t      ∆R²                     
Step 1           0.35** 
   Strength (S)    2.29      6.78** 
   Abstractness (A) -1.92     -5.65** 
   NFC    0.10      0.27 
Step 2           0.02 
   S X A   1.47      2.18* 
   NFC X S  -0.48     -0.62 
   NFC X A  -0.17     -0.23 
Step 3           0.01 
   S X A X NFC -2.76      -1.81 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
 
 Regression analyses were also run to examine the effects of importance of dental 
hygiene (IDH). As with NFC, the centered IDH variable, along with the dummy coded 
strength and abstractness variables, were entered in the first step. The second step 
contained the two-way interactions (i.e., strength X abstractness, strength X IDH, and 
abstractness X IDH). The three-way interaction among strength, abstractness, and 
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importance of dental hygiene was entered in the third and final step of the analysis. The 
results for this regression analysis are presented in Table 2. In this case, the first two 
models accounted for significant unique variance in attitudes toward the hypothetical 
toothpaste, whereas the three-way interaction entered in step 3 was not a significant 
predictor of Razzle-Dazzle evaluations. In addition to the previously obtained main effects 
for strength and abstractness and the significant strength X abstractness interaction, a main 
effect for IDH was found, such that those who placed more importance on dental health 
tended to evaluate the toothpaste more favorably than did individuals for whom dental 
hygiene was seen as less important. There was also a significant interaction between 
abstractness and IDH (see Figure 2). No other interactions containing IDH significantly 
predicted evaluations of the toothpaste. 
 To interpret the significant interaction, simple slopes analyses were conducted as 
outlined by Aiken and West (1991). The significant abstractness X IDH interaction 
indicated that the effect of the importance of dental hygiene on attitudes toward Razzle-
Dazzle depended upon the abstractness of the language used in the argument. From this 
centered variable, two new variables were created: IDHlow (one standard deviation below 
the centered factor) and IDHhigh (one standard deviation above). The effect of abstractness 
on attitudes at these two levels of the continuous IDH variable was then examined. These 
analyses revealed that the coefficients associated with abstractness differed depending 
upon the level of IDH. For those displaying high IDH, a relationship existed between 
abstractness and toothpaste evaluations such that concrete language was associated with 
more favorable attitudes than was abstract language (B=-3.53, t(150)=-6.28, p<.001). For 
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IDHlow participants, this preference for concrete over abstract language was attenuated 
(B=-1.49, t(150)=-2.87, p=.011). This pattern suggests that, although concrete language 
was viewed as more persuasive than abstract language overall, those who placed more 
importance on dental hygiene demonstrated a much greater difference in their preference 
for concrete over abstract arguments than did participants for whom dental hygiene was 
less important. 
Table 2  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Importance of Dental Hygiene as a 
Predictor of Attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 1) 
Variable     B      t     ∆R²  
 
Step 1           0.38** 
   Strength (S)    2.27      6.86** 
   Abstractness (A) -1.83     -5.51** 
   IDH    0.41      2.42* 
 
Step 2           0.06* 
   S X A   1.45      2.27* 
   IDH X S  -0.37     -1.13 
   IDH X A  -1.04     -2.98** 
 
Step 3           0.001 
   S X A X IDH 0.35      0.50 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Figure 2 The interactive effect of importance of dental hygiene and linguistic abstractness 
on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 1). 
 
Conclusions 
 Study 1 was the first attempt to test the effect of language abstractness on attitude 
change. The results provide an initial indication of the relations among argument strength, 
linguistic abstractness, and persuasion. First, argument strength had a significant impact on 
the positivity or negativity of Razzle-Dazzle evaluations. Specifically, people who read 
strong arguments about the product rated the toothpaste significantly more positively than 
did those who were exposed to weak statements. This pattern of results supported the first 
hypothesis and was in keeping with a large body of research surrounding the elaboration 
likelihood model of attitude change. The ELM predicts that, when people have the 
motivation and ability to cognitively elaborate upon the persuasive messages they 
encounter, they will find logically sound arguments to be compelling and will be apt to 
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evaluate the target object or person favorably. In contrast, such motivated individuals find 
weak communications containing less reasonable arguments to be much less convincing, 
leading them to view the object of discussion less positively. This line of reasoning nicely 
explains the findings of the current study regarding argument strength. All participants in 
the study were instructed to carefully scrutinize the messages before them, and no aspects 
of the procedure were designed to detract from participants’ ability to cognitively engage 
in the task at hand. Presumably, participants were motivated and able to cognitively 
elaborate, which in turn allowed them to engage in central route processing. Thus, having 
examined the persuasive messages with such effortful and engaged processing, participants 
were able to discern the viability of the arguments. Individuals who scrutinized strong 
arguments found them to be highly compelling; the items espousing the merits of Razzle-
Dazzle toothpaste were viewed as convincing, and as a result, the toothpaste was evaluated 
positively. When subjected to the same amount of cognitive scrutiny, weak arguments 
were viewed as much more questionable, and the product they described was not evaluated 
as positively. 
 In addition to replicating the findings of ELM research, the current study shed new 
light on the degree to which linguistic abstractness influences attitudes. At the outset, no 
specific hypotheses were advanced regarding the effect of abstractness on persuasion. As 
this variable had not been manipulated in descriptions of non-human attitude objects 
before, nor had its impact been directly examined in relation to persuasive messages, the 
direct and interactive effects of differential language abstractness on evaluations of Razzle-
Dazzle toothpaste remained an open question. A main effect for abstractness was found, 
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such that arguments containing concrete language were associated with more positive 
attitudes about the toothpaste than were those employing abstract language. This pattern of 
results may reflect individuals’ desire to “get the facts” or otherwise know the details of 
the products they buy. In carefully scrutinizing the arguments, participants may have 
viewed specific, concrete language as indicative of the product’s merit. In contrast, more 
abstract and general descriptions may have left participants feeling less satisfied and 
wanting more information. These differential interpretations of the arguments based on the 
generality versus specificity of the language they contained may have led those exposed to 
concrete language to evaluate Razzle-Dazzle more favorably than individuals who 
encountered abstract statements. 
 The third question of empirical interest was whether or not argument strength and 
linguistic abstractness would interact in affecting persuasion. In the current study, this 
interaction was significant, indicating that the effect of argument strength on attitudes 
toward Razzle-Dazzle depended upon the type of language the messages contained. For 
participants who were presented with strong arguments about the toothpaste, the relative 
generality or specificity of the language that comprised them did not lead to significantly 
different evaluations of the toothpaste. Among those who scrutinized weak arguments, 
however, the type of language used made a significant difference, such that concrete 
language was associated with much more favorable evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle than was 
abstract language. In particular, it seems that the combination of weak persuasive messages 
and broad, general descriptions (e.g., “Razzle-Dazzle has a bearable taste”) was viewed as 
particularly unconvincing, resulting in attitudes toward the toothpaste that were 
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significantly less positive than those associated with all other combinations of strength and 
abstractness. Perhaps the lack of specific terms and details, coupled with weak and largely 
illogical arguments, led people to view these messages as particularly problematic. It is 
also possible that concrete language served a compensatory function when paired with the 
weaker arguments. That is, although the statements provided did not seem terribly logical 
or convincing, the presence of detailed descriptions, statistics, and specific terminology 
may have attenuated some of the negative reactions to the weak arguments. As such, 
evaluations of the toothpaste based upon the combination of weak arguments and concrete 
language were significantly more favorable than were attitudes associated with weak 
abstract messages. 
 In addition to the findings related to the primary hypotheses, an unexpected 
interaction emerged between linguistic abstractness and the degree to which people viewed 
dental hygiene as important. In decomposing this interaction, it can be seen that the degree 
to which participants found arguments containing concrete language more compelling than 
those comprised of abstract terms depended upon the individual’s level of IDH. For those 
who placed a high degree of importance on dental hygiene, the preference for concrete 
over abstract statements was substantial. As the arguments pertained to a topic that 
mattered to these individuals (i.e., dental care), they were likely motivated to pay greater 
attention to the pro-toothpaste statements than were participants low in IDH. While 
scrutinizing the arguments closely, the high IDH participants viewed the presence of 
specific descriptions and statistics to be much more convincing than the more general and 
“fuzzy” statements contained in the abstract arguments. The distinction between concrete 
  46
and abstract language was not lost on low IDH participants. They too evaluated Razzle-
Dazzle more highly when the arguments they read contained specific figures and targeted 
information. However, those who placed relatively low importance on dental hygiene did 
not show as marked a distinction in toothpaste ratings based upon differential language 
use. This attenuation was likely due to their lower motivation to scrutinize arguments 
about toothpaste, as they viewed dental care as less personally relevant than did high IDH 
participants.  
 Study 1 provided initial evidence for the role that language type plays in 
influencing persuasion. The first study’s procedure was designed so that participants would 
have every opportunity to cognitively elaborate, thereby exercising deliberative, central 
route processing. No element of the experimental procedure limited participants’ ability to 
put forth cognitive effort in evaluating the arguments. In fact, instructions were given to 
thoroughly scrutinize the messages about the toothpaste, further increasing the likelihood 
of reliance on central route processing. Although individual differences in need for 
cognition were assessed in study 1, cognitive elaboration was not experimentally 
manipulated.  
 In study 2, participants’ level of elaboration was directly manipulated. A distraction 
task was used to limit some participants’ ability to elaborate, whereas others were not 
cognitively taxed and thus were free to evaluate the arguments with full cognitive 
resources at their disposal. This manipulation allowed for the comparison of the effects of 
argument strength and language abstractness between central- and peripheral-route 
processors.
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CHAPTER 3 Study 2 
 
 The second study examined the impact of argument strength, language 
abstractness, and level of elaboration on attitudes toward the hypothetical toothpaste 
“Razzle-Dazzle.” The ELM posits that the differential persuasiveness of strong versus 
weak arguments depends upon the degree to which people can and do put forth cognitive 
effort. As such, a cognitive elaboration manipulation was included in the current study to 
determine whether level of elaboration moderated the effect of language abstractness on 
persuasion. Thus, a distracter task (i.e., rehearsing a ten-digit number) was given to half of 
the participants in each strength/abstractness condition to determine if and how the effects 
of strength and abstractness would differ for high versus low elaborators. The study 
employed a 2 argument type (strong, weak) X 2 language type (abstract, concrete) X 2 
cognitive distracter (yes, no) between-subjects design. This gave rise to eight experimental 
conditions: 1) strong/abstract argument with no cognitive distracter (CD), 2) 
strong/concrete argument with no CD, 3) weak/abstract argument with no CD, 4) 
weak/concrete argument with no CD, 5) strong/abstract argument with CD, 6) 
strong/concrete argument with CD, 7) weak/abstract argument with CD, and 8) 
weak/concrete argument with CD.  
 In keeping with the tenets of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), it was predicted 
that strong arguments containing logically defensible points would induce more attitude 
change than would weak arguments comprised of less sound reasoning. Thus, a main effect 
of argument strength was predicted such that participants exposed to strong arguments for 
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Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste would rate the product more positively and would report being 
more likely to purchase the toothpaste and recommend it to others than would those who 
encountered weak arguments. However, the argument strength effect was expected to be 
qualified by an interaction between cognitive distraction and argument strength. Past work 
suggests that, for individuals engaged in central route processing (i.e., are operating at a 
high level of elaboration), strong arguments are significantly more persuasive than weak 
arguments. For those relying on peripheral route processing (i.e., unwilling and/or unable 
to cognitively elaborate, as when under cognitive load), strong and weak arguments do not 
lead to significantly different evaluations. In the current study, it was expected that 
participants without the cognitive distracter would display differential persuasiveness 
ratings in response to strong versus weak arguments, favoring strong arguments. 
Individuals with the cognitive distracter were not expected to demonstrate significantly 
different evaluations in response to strong versus weak arguments. The participants’ 
capacity to elaborate should be diminished by the cognitive distracter, so their ability to 
distinguish between the strong versus weak arguments should be inhibited. 
 In study 1, a main effect for linguistic abstractness was obtained. That is, 
arguments employing concrete language gave rise to more positive ratings of the 
toothpaste than did abstract language. Based upon this finding, a main effect for language 
abstractness was also predicted for study 2. Moreover, the strength by abstractness 
interaction that emerged in study 1 was predicted to occur in study 2 as well. Thus, it was 
expected that the impact of concrete versus abstract language would depend upon the 
strength of the argument. Specifically, weak arguments containing abstract descriptions 
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were expected to elicit the most negative evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle, while the negative 
attitudes associated with weak arguments were expected to be attenuated when presented 
in specific, concrete terms.  
 Finally, the interactive effect of linguistic abstractness and cognitive distraction 
remained an open research question. However, if elaboration interacted with language 
abstractness as it has been shown to do with argument strength, it was expected that 
participants with a cognitive distracter would be less likely to distinguish between the 
abstract versus concrete language because they are cognitively taxed and less able to 
scrutinize the arguments. Participants without a cognitive distracter would not be limited in 
their ability to elaborate and, thus, would be able to differentiate between the abstract and 
concrete arguments, favoring the concrete as found in study 1. 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred thirty-six undergraduate students (76 women) enrolled in psychology 
courses at Virginia Commonwealth University participated in the study for one hour of 
research credit. As with study 1, there were no exclusion criteria in regards to gender, race, 
or religious affiliation. The only requirements for participation were a minimum age of 
eighteen and fluency in English, as participants needed to be able to carefully read and 
evaluate a written argument. In addition, individuals who had participated in study 1 were 
not eligible to take part in study 2. The number of participants randomly assigned to each 
of the eight conditions was as follows: Eighteen in the strong-abstract no cognitive 
distracter (SAN) condition, fifteen in the strong-concrete no CD (SCN) condition, nineteen 
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in the weak-abstract no CD (WAN) condition, nineteen in the weak-concrete no CD 
(WCN) condition, seventeen in the strong-abstract cognitive distracter (SAD) condition, 
sixteen in the strong-concrete CD (SCD) condition, seventeen in the weak-abstract CD 
(WAD) condition, and fifteen in the weak-concrete CD (WCD) condition.   
Measures 
 The same forty arguments (ten for each strength/abstractness combination) used in 
study 1 were employed in study 2 (see Appendix A). Argument type was manipulated by 
presenting participants with either strong or weak arguments in favor of Razzle-Dazzle 
toothpaste. Language type was manipulated by employing either abstract (ADJs and SVs) 
or concrete (IAVs and DAVs) terms in the arguments. 
 In addition to the arguments, a cognitive distracter task was included to manipulate 
participants’ ability to cognitively elaborate. The particular manipulation employed was a 
number rehearsal task. Similar cognitive load manipulations have been used to inhibit 
controlled, effortful processing in a variety of domains (e.g., Bodner & Stalinski, 2008; 
Kronmüller & Barr, 2006). In the current study, a ten-digit number – 8237463159 – was 
presented prior to reading the persuasive arguments. Participants were given twenty 
seconds to commit the number to memory and then proceeded with reviewing the 
arguments and completing the follow-up measures on MediaLab (Jarvis, 2000). After 
completing these assessments, participants in the distracter condition were prompted to 
type the ten-digit number from the beginning as accurately as possible. 
 Attitude Measures. Participants’ attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste were 
assessed using the same series of items used in study 1 (see Appendix B). Participants 
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rated Razzle-Dazzle on five semantic differential scales, ranging from -4 to +4, with the 
following endpoints: (a) like/dislike, (b) good/bad, (c) negative/positive, (d) 
favorable/unfavorable, and (e) against/in favor. Participants also were asked to provide a 
rating of their likelihood of trying, purchasing, and recommending Razzle-Dazzle 
toothpaste based upon the arguments presented. As in study 1, a composite variable was 
created from the attitudinal and behavioral measures. All five attitude items and the three 
behavioral questions were highly correlated (rs from .62 to .91) and exhibited very good 
internal reliability (α=.85).4  
 Need for Cognition Scale. This eighteen-item scale assessing individual differences 
in engagement in and enjoyment of effortful cognitive processing was also included in 
study 2 (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; see Appendix C). After reverse-scoring the necessary 
items, the NFC scale demonstrated high inter-item reliability (α=.84). As in study 1, the 
average of these eighteen items was then computed to create a composite NFC score. 
 Need for Affect Scale. Given that many abstract messages, while vague, can be 
very emotionally compelling, it was possible that people who were more motivated to 
express and experience emotion would find abstract arguments to be more persuasive than 
would those who did not routinely engage in emotional processing. In order to assess 
individual differences in motivations to experience emotion, the need for affect scale was 
included in study 2 (see Appendix F). Developed by Maio and Esses (2001), this scale is  
________________________ 
 4. As in study 1, main analyses were also conducted using individual attitude and 
behavior items as the dependent measure; these provided the same pattern of results 
obtained by using the combined attitude/behavior measure as the DV. 
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comprised of twenty-six items assessing individual differences in people’s motivation to 
approach or avoid emotions in their daily lives. This scale has good internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α =.85) and includes items such as “I would prefer not to experience either the 
lows or highs of emotion” (item 9) and “I approach situations in which I expect to 
experience strong emotions” (item 7, reverse-scored). Individuals are instructed to indicate 
the extent to which they agree with each item on a scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” 
to 5 “strongly agree.” After reverse-scoring the necessary items, the NFA scale 
demonstrated good inter-item reliability (α=.84). The average of these twenty-six items 
was computed to create a composite NFA score. 
 Importance of Dental Hygiene Questionnaire. The importance placed upon dental 
hygiene was assessed using the same items as in study 1 (see Appendix D). Again, self-
reports of the importance of dental hygiene and the number of times people brushed per 
day were significantly correlated (r=.28, p<.05) and were combined to form a composite 
IDH variable. 
 Demographics Questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a demographics 
questionnaire (see Appendix E) assessing age, sex, marital status, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, and hometown size. 
Procedure   
 The procedure for study 2 was nearly identical to that of study 1. Upon arrival at 
the lab, participants were seated individually and told that they would be participating in a 
study about how people make choices about consumer products. Following informed 
consent, half of the participants were presented with arguments supporting the hypothetical 
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toothpaste Razzle-Dazzle and responded to a) the attitude measures, b) the need for affect 
scale, c) the need for cognition scale, d) the importance of dental hygiene questionnaire, 
and e) the demographics questionnaire on MediaLab, just as was done in study 1. 
Throughout these assessments, participants retained the argument sheet and were 
encouraged to refer back to the statements in responding to the questions presented.  
 The remaining half of participants comprised the cognitive distracter conditions. 
They followed a very similar procedure to that outlined above, except that, before being 
given the Razzle-Dazzle arguments, participants were presented with a ten-digit number 
and were given twenty seconds to commit the number to memory. These participants then 
proceeded with scrutinizing the toothpaste arguments and responding to the follow-up 
questionnaires on MediaLab. Finally, participants in the cognitive distracter conditions 
were instructed to type the ten-digit number to the best of their ability. All participants 
were then debriefed, any questions they raised were answered, and they were dismissed.    
Results 
 All variables of interest were found to meet the assumptions of linearity, normality, 
and homogeneity of variance required to run subsequent analyses. Thus, tests of study 2’s 
hypotheses were conducted using data in its original form without transformation, deletion, 
or other manipulation. As in the first study, conditions did not differ in terms of the 
motivational factors (i.e., NFA, NFC, and IDH) or the demographic variables. 
Manipulation Checks 
 In order to ensure that the strength and abstractness manipulations were successful, 
two questions assessing perceived strength and one regarding abstractness were again 
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included in the follow-up measures. For both strength items (“How strong is this 
argument?” and “How convincing is this argument?”), responses could range from 1 to 9, 
with higher numbers indicating stronger or more convincing arguments. These items were 
highly correlated (r=.84) and were subsequently averaged to create a composite variable 
assessing perceived strength (α=.91). A one-way ANOVA assessing the effect of 
manipulated argument strength on perceived strength revealed that the strength 
manipulation was effective, F(1, 134)=47.91, p<.001, partial η2=.26. Strong arguments 
received significantly stronger ratings (M=7.49, SD=1.67) than did weak arguments 
(M=5.06, SD=2.35). 
 A similar manipulation check was incorporated to assess the effectiveness of 
creating arguments of differential abstractness. The same item used in study 1 (“How 
specific is this argument?”) was embedded in the follow-up questionnaires; responses 
again ranged from 1 (specific) to 9 (general), with larger numbers indicating greater 
perceived abstractness and smaller values corresponding to more concrete arguments. A 
one-way ANOVA assessing the impact of assigned abstractness on perceived 
generality/specificity of the arguments was significant, F(1,134)=17.03, p<.001, partial 
η
2
=.11, indicating that abstract arguments were rated as more general (M=6.72, SD=2.18) 
than were concrete statements (M=5.00, SD=2.67).  
Tests of Main Hypotheses 
 Of primary interest were the effects of argument strength, language abstractness, 
and level of elaboration on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle. However, it was possible that 
need for affect (NFA), need for cognition (NFC) and/or importance of dental hygiene 
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could significantly affect attitudes toward the hypothetical toothpaste. In order to control 
for these factors and examine both main and interactive effects of the independent 
measures, a 2 strength (strong, weak) X 2 abstractness (abstract, concrete) X 2 cognitive 
distracter (yes, no) between subjects analysis of covariance was conducted with NFA, 
NFC, and IDH entered as covariates. A significant main effect for strength was found, 
F(1,124)=63.78, p<.001, partial η2=.34, indicating that participants who read strong 
arguments about the toothpaste evaluated it significantly more positively (M=7.38, 
SD=1.57) than did those who read weak arguments (M=5.22, SD=1.57). This supported the 
initial hypothesis that strong arguments would lead to more positive attitudes about the 
target than would weak arguments. There was also a main effect of abstractness on 
evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle, F(1,124)=39.27, p<.001, partial η²=.24. Specifically, 
arguments containing concrete language were associated with significantly more positive 
attitudes about the toothpaste (M=7.15, SD=1.57) than were those comprised of abstract 
descriptions (M=5.46, SD=1.56). This finding was in keeping with study 2’s second 
hypothesis, namely that concrete arguments would be viewed as significantly more 
persuasive than abstract messages. 
 Finally, the main effects were qualified by a significant strength X abstractness 
interaction, F(1,124)=14.29, p<.001, partial η2=.10. Tukey post-hoc tests were conducted 
to determine which combinations of strength and abstractness differed significantly in 
terms of attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle. The pattern of means is depicted in Figure 3. 
Similar to study 1 results, participants in the weak-abstract (WA) condition evaluated 
Razzle-Dazzle significantly less favorably (M=3.87, SD=1.58) than did participants in the 
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weak-concrete (WC; M=6.58, SD=1.57), strong-abstract (SA; M=7.05, SD=1.57), and 
strong-concrete (M=7.39, SD=1.56) conditions, all ps < .05. Mean evaluations for the 
toothpaste did not differ significantly for the SA, SC, and WC conditions, ps > .25. 
 
Figure 3 The interactive effect of argument strength and linguistic abstractness on attitudes 
toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 2). 
 
 In addition to the strength X abstractness interaction, it was also hypothesized that 
the effect of argument strength on Razzle-Dazzle evaluations would depend upon the 
presence or absence of a cognitive distraction. It was predicted that, whereas those not 
charged with recalling a ten-digit number would find strong arguments significantly more 
convincing than weak arguments, this difference would not emerge for participants who 
were kept busy with the distracter task. This interactive effect did not emerge, 
F(1,124)=.66, p=.42, partial η2=.01. 
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 The interaction of cognitive elaboration and linguistic abstractness did not reach a 
conventional level of significance, F(1,124)=3.07, p=.08, partial η2=.08. The pattern of 
results is depicted in Figure 4. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that, although evaluations of 
the toothpaste associated with abstract arguments did not differ between low elaborators 
(M=5.36, SD=2.05) and high elaborators (M=5.54, SD=2.62; p=.37), there was a trend for 
those in the low elaboration condition to rate Razzle-Dazzle more positively in response to 
concrete arguments (M=7.49, SD=1.36) than individuals in the high elaboration condition 
(M=6.71, SD=1.49; p=.15). 
 
Figure 4 The interactive effect of linguistic abstractness and level of cognitive elaboration 
on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 2). 
 
Tests of Motivational Factors 
 In order to determine if any of the motivational factors (i.e., NFA, NFC, or IDH) 
significantly affected attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle or moderated the effects of the 
manipulated variables, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted predicting attitudes 
  58
toward Razzle-Dazzle from the individual difference variables and the independent 
variables (i.e., strength, abstractness, and cognitive elaboration). First, in accordance with 
Aiken and West (1991), the variables of NFA, NFC, and IDH were centered to reduce 
collinearity. As in study 1, both strength and abstractness were dummy coded (0 = “weak,” 
1 = “strong”; 0 = “concrete,” 1 = “abstract”, respectively), as was level of elaboration (0 = 
“no distracter,” 1 = “distracter”).  
 The first regression analysis conducted examined the effects of need for affect. In 
the first step, the four main effects were entered (i.e., NFA, strength, abstractness, and 
cognitive distracter). The two-way interactions were entered in the second step (i.e., 
strength X abstractness, strength X NFA, abstractness X NFA, strength X distracter, 
abstractness X distracter, and NFA X distracter). The three-way interactions were entered 
into the third step (i.e., strength X abstractness X NFA, strength X distracter X NFA, 
strength X abstractness X distracter, and abstractness X distracter X NFA). The fourth and 
final step was comprised of the four-way interaction among strength, abstractness, 
elaboration level, and NFA. The full results of this regression analysis are presented in 
Table 3. The first two models predicted significant unique variance in evaluations of 
Razzle-Dazzle. These effects were driven by the effects of strength, abstractness, and their 
interaction. No interactions containing NFA emerged as significant predictors of toothpaste 
attitudes. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Need for Affect as a Predictor of Attitudes 
toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 2) 
Variable           B        t      ∆R²  
 
Step 1           0.42** 
   Strength (S)     2.22     7.81** 
   Abstractness (A)   -1.66    -5.87** 
   Distracter (CD)    0.18     0.65 
   NFA    -0.03    -0.18 
Step 2           0.08* 
   S X A     1.95     3.59** 
   S X CD    -0.54    -1.00 
   A X CD    -0.83    -1.53 
   NFA X S     0.48     1.14 
   NFA X A     0.04     0.09 
   NFA X CD   -0.003    -0.01 
Step 3           0.003 
   S X A X CD   -0.63     -0.58 
   NFA X S X A   0.09      0.17 
   NFA X S X CD   0.43      0.67 
   NFA X A X CD   -0.05    -0.10 
Step 4           0.003 
    NFA X S X A X CD  1.05      0.91 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
 
 The second regression analysis examined the effects of need for cognition. Main 
effects for strength, abstractness, cognitive distracter, and NFC were entered in the first 
step. Two-way interactions were entered in the second step (i.e., strength X abstractness, 
strength X NFC, abstractness X NFC, strength X distracter, abstractness X distracter, and 
NFC X distracter). The three-way interactions comprised the third step (i.e., strength X 
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abstractness X NFC, strength X distracter X NFC, strength X abstractness X distracter, and 
abstractness X distracter X NFC). The four-way interaction among strength, abstractness, 
distracter, and NFC was entered in the fourth and final step. The results of this regression 
analysis are presented in Table 4. The first two models were significant, but again this was 
driven by the effects of strength, abstractness, and their interaction. No interactions 
containing NFC reached significance. 
Table 4 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Need for Cognition as a Predictor of 
Attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 2) 
Variable           B        t      ∆R²  
 
Step 1           0.43** 
   Strength (S)     2.18      7.71** 
   Abstractness (A)  -1.65     -5.86** 
   Distracter (CD)    0.20      0.48 
   NFC    -0.32    -1.28 
Step 2           0.07* 
   S X A     1.85      3.38** 
   S X CD    -0.45     -0.82 
   A X CD    -0.91     -1.68 
   NFC X S     0.16      0.32 
   NFC X A    -0.94    - 1.23 
   NFC X CD     0.45      0.89 
Step 3           0.004 
   S X A X CD    -0.24     -0.22 
   NFC X S X A    0.26      0.25 
   NFC X S X CD    0.09      0.08 
   NFC X A X CD    -0.93    -0.88 
Step 4           0.000 
    NFC X S X A X CD -0.09     -0.04 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
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 To test importance of dental hygiene (IDH), the centered IDH variable, along with 
the dummy coded strength, abstractness, and elaboration variables, were entered in the first 
step of a hierarchical regression analysis. The second step contained the two-way 
interactions (i.e., strength X abstractness, strength X IDH, abstractness X IDH, strength X 
distracter, abstractness X distracter, and IDH X distracter). The three-way interactions 
were entered in the third step (i.e., strength X abstractness X IDH, strength X distracter X 
IDH, strength X abstractness X distracter, and abstractness X distracter X IDH). The four-
way interaction among strength, abstractness, elaboration, and IDH was entered in the 
fourth and final step. The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 4. As 
with NFA and NFC, the first two models accounted for significant unique variance in 
attitudes toward the hypothetical toothpaste, whereas the three- and four-way interactions 
entered in steps 3 and 4 were not significant predictors of Razzle-Dazzle evaluations. The 
main effects of strength and abstractness were significant, as was their interaction. The 
interaction between abstractness and elaboration was marginally significant. Specifically, 
those given the additional number rehearsal task provided more positive evaluations of the 
toothpaste when presented with concrete (M=7.49, SD=1.36) as opposed to abstract 
language (M=5.36, SD=2.05). Among participants in the non-distracter conditions, this 
preference for concrete (M=6.71, SD=1.49) over abstract language (M=5.53, SD=2.62) 
tended to be less pronounced. The interaction between abstractness and IDH was also 
marginally significant. The pattern of results matched that obtained in study 1 and is 
presented in Figure 5. For those displaying high IDH, concrete language was associated 
with more favorable attitudes than was abstract language (B=-2.27, t(125)=-5.13, p<.001). 
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For participants low in IDH, this preference for concrete over abstract language was 
attenuated (B=-1.78, t(125)=-3.38, p=.001). This pattern suggests that, although concrete 
language was more compelling than abstract language overall, individuals who placed 
more importance on dental hygiene displayed a much greater preference for concrete over 
abstract arguments than did participants for whom dental hygiene was less important. No 
other interactions containing IDH significantly predicted evaluations of the toothpaste. 
Table 5 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Importance of Dental Hygiene as a 
Predictor of Attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 2) 
Variable           B        t      ∆R²  
 
Step 1           0.43** 
   Strength (S)     2.24      7.99** 
   Abstractness (A)  -1.69     -6.03** 
   Distracter (CD)   0.16      0.58 
   IDH    -0.32    -1.61 
Step 2           0.09** 
   S X A     2.14      4.04** 
   S X CD    -0.42     -0.80 
   A X CD    -1.01     -1.91+ 
   IDH X S     0.28      0.70 
   IDH X A   -0.69     -1.75+ 
   IDH X CD     0.01      0.03 
Step 3           0.007 
   S X A X CD   -0.20     -0.19 
   IDH X S X A  -0.63     -0.77 
   IDH X S X CD    0.11      0.13 
   IDH X A X CD   -0.99     -1.20 
Step 4           0.007 
    IDH X S X A X CD  2.24      1.36 
+ p < .08, * p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Figure 5 The interactive effect of the importance of dental hygiene and linguistic 
abstractness on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle (Study 2). 
 
Conclusions 
 The purpose of the second study was to replicate and extend the findings from 
study 1. The relations among argument strength, linguistic abstractness, and persuasion 
were again examined, but an additional manipulation was included to determine if and how 
reduced ability to cognitively elaborate would impact the effects of strength and 
abstractness on attitudes. Several hypotheses were advanced at the outset of the current 
study. First, a main effect for argument strength was predicted, such that stronger messages 
would give rise to more favorable ratings of the target product, Razzle-Dazzle. Supporting 
this hypothesis, argument strength was found to significantly influence the positivity or 
negativity of Razzle-Dazzle evaluations. Specifically, people who read strong arguments 
about the toothpaste rated it significantly more favorably than did those who encountered 
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weak statements. This pattern of results replicated the findings of study 1 and was in 
keeping with a large body of research surrounding the elaboration likelihood model. The 
ELM predicts that individuals will find logically defensible arguments to be convincing 
and will in turn evaluate the target object or person positively. In contrast, people tend to 
find weak message (i.e., those containing less sound reasoning) to be much less 
convincing; they come to view the target less favorably.  
 In addition to finding the main effect described by the ELM, the main effect of 
language abstractness on attitudes was also replicated. In the first study, analyses indicated 
that arguments containing concrete language were associated with more positive 
evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle than were messages comprised of abstract terms. This main 
effect for abstractness was found in study 2 as well, suggesting that individuals may have 
preferred concrete statements because they provided greater specificity about the consumer 
product being advertised. If such a desire to “get the facts” were motivating participants, 
they may have viewed specific, concrete language as evidence of the toothpaste’s merit. In 
contrast, more abstract descriptions may have been interpreted as too general to justify 
liking Razzle-Dazzle.  
 The third question of empirical interest was whether or not argument strength and 
linguistic abstractness would interact in affecting persuasion. Based upon the significant 
strength X abstractness interaction obtained in study 1, it was hypothesized that these 
variables would again interact to influence attitudes. Specifically, it was predicted that the 
least favorable evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle would be provided by individuals in the 
weak-abstract (WA) conditions. In study 2, this interaction was again significant, 
  65
indicating that the effect of argument strength on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle depended 
upon the type of language the messages contained. Moreover, the specific pattern of results 
found in study 1 was obtained in the current study as well. That is, the toothpaste ratings 
made by participants who encountered strong arguments were relatively positive, 
regardless of the generality or specificity of the language that comprised them. Among 
those who scrutinized weak arguments, however, concrete language gave rise to much 
more favorable evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle than did abstract language. As predicted, the 
combination of weak persuasive messages and broad, general descriptions found in the 
WA conditions led to the lowest ratings of the toothpaste, indicating that statements such 
as “Razzle-Dazzle is a decent plaque fighter” were viewed as unconvincing. As weak 
arguments containing concrete terms were not as poorly received as those comprised of 
abstract language, it may be that concrete language served to attenuate negative reactions 
to logically unsound arguments. As in study 1, toothpaste attitudes for the WC conditions 
were significantly more favorable than were evaluations provided by those in the WA 
conditions. 
 In addition to replicating the findings obtained in study 1, the current study sought 
to expand the investigation of the relationship between language, argument, and 
persuasion. To that end, another factor, cognitive elaboration, was manipulated via a 
distracter task. All participants in the first study were free to put forward as much cognitive 
effort as they could (or would) in reading about and evaluating the toothpaste. That is, they 
were presumably operating at a relatively high level of cognitive elaboration, implying that 
their attitudes about Razzle-Dazzle were determined via central route processing. In such 
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instances, the ELM predicts that strong arguments will be viewed as more persuasive than 
weak arguments, a prediction supported by the main effect for strength obtained in both of 
the current studies. 
 In contrast, this significant preference for strong over weak arguments is expected 
to diminish when one is engaged in peripheral route processing. Defined by a lack of 
cognitive elaboration, peripheral route processing occurs when people do not (or cannot) 
think deliberatively about the persuasive message at hand. Shallower processing gives rise 
to less disparity in evaluations of a target object based on argument strength; strong 
messages are no longer viewed as significantly more persuasive than weak arguments.  
 In study 2, the participants required to rehearse the ten-digit number were limited in 
their ability to put forth cognitive effort in scrutinizing the arguments about the toothpaste. 
These individuals were theoretically operating at a low level of elaboration. Therefore, it 
was expected that the effect of argument strength on Razzle-Dazzle evaluations would 
depend upon whether or not participants were able to cognitively elaborate on those 
arguments. Specifically, the ELM predicts that high elaborators will provide significantly 
more positive ratings following strong than weak arguments; for low elaborators, this 
difference is expected to decrease or disappear altogether.  
 This predicted pattern of results did not emerge in study 2: The interactive effect of 
argument strength and cognitive elaboration on ratings of Razzle-Dazzle was not 
significant. Instead, the main effect of argument strength remained unqualified, such that 
both those exposed to the cognitive distracter and those who were not rated the toothpaste 
more positively if they had read strong as opposed to weak arguments. As over two-thirds 
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of participants in the cognitive distracter conditions correctly recalled at least five of the 
ten digits, it seems unlikely that a failure to follow directions can explain the non-
significant finding. A possible explanation for this failure to replicate previous findings in 
the ELM literature is that the strong and weak arguments differed so markedly from one 
another that little attention was necessary to detect the irrationality of the weak messages. 
As several of the statements comprising the weak arguments were rather blatantly not 
positive (e.g., “RD, Inc. is not an environmentally friendly company”), perceiving the 
implausibility of such phrases may have required little, if any, cognitive resources. If 
minimal thought was necessary to “see through” the weak arguments, even participants 
subjected to the cognitive load manipulation may have come to view the message as 
unconvincing, giving rise to poor Razzle-Dazzle evaluations across conditions containing 
weak arguments.  
 Despite not interacting with argument strength, elaboration level was found to have 
a marginally significant interactive effect with linguistic abstractness. Closer investigation 
of this trend indicated that, although high and low cognitive elaborators did not view 
abstract language as differentially persuasive, those subjected to the cognitive load 
manipulation rated the toothpaste higher when it was described concretely than did 
participants in the non-distracter conditions. Perhaps participants under cognitive load 
viewed the specific terms, statistics, and figures presented in the concrete arguments as a 
cue to the product’s merit. In essence, concrete language may have functioned as a 
peripheral cue for those in the low elaboration conditions. Although the number rehearsal 
task taxed participants’ cognitive resources, it is possible that the mere presence of 
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numerical values and detailed descriptions may have been enough to convince low 
elaborators that the toothpaste was supported by sound evidence. In addition, arguments 
containing concrete language tended to be slightly longer, on average, than were the 
abstract statements. As past work by Petty and Cacioppo (1984) has shown, overall 
message length can function as a peripheral cue for individuals operating at a low level of 
elaboration. In reading the arguments, these individuals tend to be convinced by the length 
of the argument, such that longer messages give rise to more favorable attitudes toward the 
target than shorter messages. In the present study, the relatively longer length of the 
arguments containing concrete descriptions may explain low elaborators’ preference for 
them over abstract messages. 
 In addition to the findings related to the primary hypotheses, the interaction 
between linguistic abstractness and the importance of dental hygiene was once again 
obtained. Replicating the previous pattern of results, the degree to which participants found 
concrete statements more compelling than abstract messages was dependent upon one’s 
level of IDH. Participants who placed a high degree of importance on dental hygiene 
showed a significant preference for concrete over abstract statements. High IDH 
participants likely viewed the presence of specific terms to be much more convincing than 
the vague statements contained in the abstract arguments. As the arguments pertained to a 
topic that mattered to these individuals (i.e., dental care), they were likely motivated to pay 
greater attention to the pro-toothpaste statements than were participants low in IDH. 
Although low IDH individuals also evaluated Razzle-Dazzle more highly when they read 
concrete arguments that contained specific figures and targeted information, they did not 
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show as substantial a difference in toothpaste ratings based upon differential language use. 
This attenuation was likely due to their relatively low motivation to deeply process 
information they viewed as not terribly relevant. 
 Study 2 provided further evidence for the impact that differential linguistic 
abstractness has on attitude change. Primary hypotheses regarding argument strength and 
language abstractness were supported, thereby replicating the findings of study 1. In 
addition, study 2 sought to expand upon the first study’s results by adding a cognitive load 
manipulation. The first study’s procedure was designed so that participants would have 
every opportunity to cognitively elaborate, thereby exercising deliberative, central route 
processing. In contrast, half of study 2 participants read the arguments while 
simultaneously rehearsing a ten-digit number in working memory. This manipulation 
allowed for the direct investigation of the effect of high versus low elaboration on 
argument strength, linguistic abstractness, and attitude change. 
  70
CHAPTER 4 General Discussion 
 
 The goal of the present research was to examine how the type of language used in a 
persuasive message affects attitudes and behavioral intentions. In order to accomplish this, 
two existing models of persuasion and language were integrated – the elaboration 
likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) and the linguistic category model 
(LCM; Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Specifically, the function of linguistic abstractness in a 
persuasive context was explored. The first experiment was an initial test of whether 
language abstractness could be manipulated in regard to an inanimate object and affect 
attitudes toward a hypothetical product (i.e., Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste). The second 
experiment was intended to replicate and extend the findings from study 1.     
 In study 1, argument strength (strong versus weak) and linguistic abstractness 
(abstract versus concrete) were manipulated in order to determine how different 
combinations of these factors would affect participants’ evaluations of a product. In 
keeping with the tenets of the ELM and the initial hypotheses, a main effect for argument 
strength was found, such that strong arguments were viewed as significantly more 
convincing than weak arguments. Participants who read logically sound statements about 
the merits of Razzle-Dazzle subsequently rated the toothpaste more favorably and 
indicated more willingness to purchase or try the toothpaste than did those who 
encountered less reasonable messages. 
 The language abstractness manipulation was a completely novel endeavor as it had 
never been directly investigated in a persuasive context or with regard to an inanimate 
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object. Thus, no predictions were initially put forward regarding any main or interactive 
effects that linguistic abstractness might have on attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle. In study 
1, language type was found to directly affect attitudes, such that more positive toothpaste 
evaluations were reported by participants who read messages containing concrete 
descriptions than by those who were presented with abstract terms. In addition, a 
significant interaction between argument strength and linguistic abstractness also emerged. 
Although the use of concrete versus abstract language did not lead to different evaluations 
when the arguments were strong, participants’ reactions to weak arguments depended upon 
the specificity versus generality of the descriptions they contained. In particular, 
individuals exposed to weak arguments comprised of abstract language reported the least 
favorable evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle out of all the conditions.  
 These findings suggest that language abstractness becomes a more important 
determinant of a message’s persuasiveness when the message itself is viewed as illogical 
or faulty. When an argument was sound and logically defensible, it was seen as 
convincing, regardless of the generality or specificity of the language it contained. 
Therefore, strong arguments gave rise to universally positive attitudes toward the target. In 
contrast, weak arguments were considered largely unconvincing in their own right. Thus, 
individuals exposed to weak arguments may have then “dug deeper,” considering the 
amount of detail that the message contained. Participants encountering abstract language 
within messages of questionable merit may have viewed this lack of precision or detail as 
further indication of the argument’s weakness. With essentially nothing about the 
persuasive message indicating the toothpaste’s worth, participants exposed to the weak, 
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abstract arguments rated Razzle-Dazzle significantly less favorably than did those in all 
other conditions. When exposed to weak, concrete arguments, on the other hand, 
individuals may have viewed the specificity and detail provided by the concrete 
descriptions as an indication that the argument was not all that weak after all. In essence, 
concrete language may have acted as a buffer against the negative reactions to illogical 
arguments, making them more palatable and more convincing than they would have been 
otherwise. This attenuation of the impact of weak arguments when coupled with concrete 
language may explain why those in the weak, concrete condition held significantly more 
positive attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle than did participants in the weak, abstract 
condition. 
 Besides argument strength and language abstractness, the influence of motivational 
factors (i.e., need for cognition and importance of dental hygiene) were considered. Need 
for cognition did not predict attitudes or moderate the effects of the independent variables. 
This individual difference factor may not have mattered in the current studies because 
toothpaste is likely not that important or complex of an attitude object for college 
undergraduates to evaluate. However, the importance of dental hygiene (IDH) did predict 
attitudes toward the toothpaste. This factor served as a measure of people’s motivation 
toward the specific topic. High IDH individuals tended to rate Razzle-Dazzle more 
favorably than did low IDH participants, likely because they found the target (a product 
promoting dental hygiene) to be more personally relevant. Moreover, IDH interacted with 
linguistic abstractness, such that preferences for concrete over abstract language were more 
pronounced for individuals who cared more about dental hygiene than for those less 
  73
concerned with dental health. This was also likely due to high IDH participants being more 
motivated to scrutinize messages about toothpaste because it mattered more to them than it 
did to low IDH individuals. Those high in IDH may have picked up on subtleties in 
linguistic abstractness to which low IDH participants were relatively less sensitive.  
Study 1 provided the first indication that the type of language employed in a 
persuasive message does matter. The language abstractness manipulation affected attitudes 
both directly and in tandem with argument strength. That is, evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle 
were driven by both the strength of the persuasive arguments and the abstractness versus 
concreteness of the language they contained. Language abstractness also interacted with 
self-reported importance of dental hygiene, indicating that motivational factors moderated 
the influence of language. The findings from the first study were very promising, so study 
2 was designed to replicate these findings to ensure the validity of the results. Also, the 
second experiment included a third independent variable: cognitive elaboration. As the 
ability to engage in effortful cognitive processing has been demonstrated to affect 
persuasion, an additional purpose of study 2 was to determine whether level of elaboration 
determined the effect of language abstractness. Previous research has demonstrated that 
reduced elaboration attenuates the ability to distinguish between strong and weak 
arguments. Thus, reduced elaboration may have diminished the distinction between 
abstract versus concrete language. That individuals higher in the motivational factor IDH 
showed a greater preference for concrete over abstract descriptions than did those for 
whom dental hygiene was seen as less important suggests that the high IDH participants 
were operating at a slightly higher level of cognitive elaboration than their low IDH 
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counterparts. In study 2, cognitive elaboration was directly manipulated by employing a 
distracter task (i.e., memorizing a 10-digit number). Motivational factors (i.e., need for 
cognition and importance of dental hygiene) were again considered, as well as participants’ 
need for affect. This individual difference variable was included in order to control for the 
possibility that abstract descriptions would be viewed as more convincing by those who 
more readily expressed and experienced emotion.  
 First, the findings from study 1 were replicated in study 2. Argument strength, 
linguistic abstractness, and the motivational factor importance of dental hygiene 
contributed to differences in participants’ evaluations of Razzle-Dazzle toothpaste. Need 
for cognition and need for affect did not predict attitudes toward Razzle-Dazzle or 
moderate the effects of the independent variables. Of more interest for study 2 were the 
effects of elaboration and whether this factor interacted with argument strength and 
language abstractness. 
Surprisingly, the expected interaction between strength and elaboration did not 
emerge. Past ELM research has demonstrated that individuals using central route 
processing, or high elaboration, prefer strong arguments to weak arguments, whereas 
individuals using peripheral route processing, or low elaboration, do not differentiate 
between strong and weak arguments. A few potential explanations for this lack of 
replication were considered. The first explanation calls into question the ability of the 
distracter manipulation to differentiate between high and low elaboration. Potentially, 
those in the cognitive distracter condition may not have been sufficiently limited in their 
cognitive reserves as to be unable to put forth effortful thought in considering the 
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arguments. However, given that this particular cognitive load manipulation (i.e., rehearsing 
a number) has been used extensively and effectively to deplete individuals’ cognitive 
resources (e.g., Bodner & Stalinski, 2008; Kronmüller & Barr, 2006), it seems unlikely 
that the number task failed to distract participants in the current study.  
 In a similar vein, it was presumably possible that the cognitive load manipulation 
did not work because participants failed to follow instructions and did not rehearse the 
number. If individuals disregarded the rehearsal task, they would not have been cognitively 
taxed or limited in their ability to scrutinize the arguments about Razzle-Dazzle – in effect, 
they would have been operating at a high level of elaboration, just as those in the non-
distracter conditions were. An examination of the accuracy of participants’ digit recall 
casts doubt on this possibility, however. Nearly three-quarters of the participants in the 
distracter conditions (71%) correctly recalled at least half of the digits – a feat that would 
have been extremely difficult had they not been actively rehearsing the number as 
instructed. Also, on a more anecdotal note, many participants charged with rehearsing the 
number finished the session and immediately inquired as to the accuracy of their recall. 
This indicates that individuals took the distracter task seriously and cared about their 
competence at the task, further demonstrating that the cognitive load task was effective in 
limiting participants’ elaboration level. 
 Finally, the strong and weak arguments in the current study differed considerably in 
their quality. Even a cursory review of the weak arguments (e.g., “Razzle-Dazzle has a 
bearable taste”) shows them to be mediocre endorsements at best. The weakness of the 
arguments may have been too extreme to mistake. Most of the persuasive messages we 
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encounter on a daily basis at least appear convincing at first blush. The fact that the weak 
arguments for the toothpaste were rather questionable may have been obvious, even to 
those under cognitive load. In essence, the blatant weakness of these arguments may have 
required only minimal cognitive effort to ascertain, such that even rehearsing a ten-digit 
number (i.e., operating at a low level of elaboration) was not enough to mask their 
unsoundness. 
 There was a marginally significant interaction between language abstractness and 
elaboration. Specifically, those under conditions of cognitive distraction showed a more 
pronounced preference for concrete over abstract language than did participants not 
engaged in the number rehearsal task. Although it was initially unclear whether language 
abstractness and elaboration would interact, the pattern of results were not necessarily 
expected. If anything, low elaboration, or peripheral route processing, was expected to 
reduce the ability to distinguish between abstract and concrete language, as is the case with 
strong versus weak arguments. The results may be due to the arguments themselves 
differing in ways other than just their linguistic abstractness. These extraneous features 
may have served as peripheral cues, such that even individuals under cognitive load were 
able to differentiate between abstract versus concrete arguments.  
In general, concrete arguments tended to be slightly longer than those containing 
abstract language. As messages containing concrete language typically employed greater 
description, they often stretched further across the page than did abstract descriptions – a 
fact that is discernible without close scrutiny. Past research (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) has 
shown that message length can function as a peripheral cue for individuals under 
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conditions of low elaboration. It is possible that, in the current study, people in the low 
elaboration condition (i.e., those subjected to the number rehearsal task) noticed that 
concrete messages were long and took longer messages to be indicative of better 
arguments than shorter statements (which tended to contain abstract language). This could 
explain why those in the cognitive load conditions showed a slightly greater preference for 
concrete over abstract language than did participants in the high elaboration condition.  
 Also, concrete arguments in the current study contained numerical values, which 
were included in an effort to increase the specificity of the arguments. It is highly possible 
that the presence of a number, regardless of the digit’s significance, was viewed as some 
evidence of the argument’s merit. In contrast, abstract messages did not contain any digits 
or statistics, as these were considered to incur a level of specificity that more appropriately 
served the concrete descriptions than the abstract terms. The lack of statistics and numbers 
in the abstract arguments may have been taken by low elaborators as indication that the 
overall argument was not clear or sound, which in turn may have translated into less 
favorable ratings of Razzle-Dazzle in response to abstract versus concrete arguments.  
Addressing Limitations 
 In order to address the possibility that systematic differences between strong versus 
weak and abstract versus concrete arguments tipped off low elaboration participants, a 
follow-up study is in progress using arguments that have been modified and standardized. 
Weak arguments are no longer obviously questionable. For instance, the statement 
“Razzle-Dazzle has a bearable taste” has been altered to “…has a decent taste.” This 
should reduce the likelihood that low elaborators (i.e., those subjected to a distracter task) 
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will be able to perceive the weakness of these arguments without exerting cognitive effort. 
With these changes in place, it is expected that the strength X elaboration interaction 
predicted by the ELM will emerge. That is, high elaborators will evaluate the toothpaste 
more positively in response to strong versus weak arguments, whereas those in the low 
elaboration conditions will not differ in their evaluations of the toothpaste depending upon 
the strength of the arguments they encounter. 
Concrete and abstract arguments have been standardized in terms of sheer length in 
the follow-up study; namely, messages containing concrete language have been shortened 
to more closely match the length of those comprised of abstract descriptions. Again, this 
should make it more difficult for those in the low elaboration condition to rely on message 
length as a peripheral cue to the argument’s merit. Finally, all numerical values have been 
written out (e.g., “45%” becomes “forty-five percent”), eliminating the possibility that 
these digits could function as a peripheral cue for those under cognitive load.   
Broader Implications 
 Despite these limitations, the results from the current studies provide promising 
initial insight into the importance of language in persuasion. Past research in the area of 
persuasion has largely focused on how variables related to message content, superficial 
cues, and elaboration influence attitude change. In so doing, the persuasion literature has 
overlooked an important component of persuasive communications – the language used to 
express it. The findings from the current studies provide the first empirical evidence that 
the type of language used in a persuasive communication has direct implications for 
attitudes about the target of that message. Investigations into the function that language 
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serves within the persuasive context could clarify exactly how such linguistic distinctions 
give rise to differential evaluations. It could be that language acts as an element of the 
argument itself, speaking directly to the message’s overall quality in the same way that 
argument strength does. Alternatively, language type may function as a peripheral cue, 
more removed from the argument’s content, which serves to inform the evaluations of low 
elaborators in the absence of deep cognitive processing, much as features such as message 
length do. As the ELM states that it is possible for the same variable to function in 
different ways depending upon the specific persuasive context, linguistic abstractness may 
act as a more central feature of the argument itself in certain situations and play a more 
peripheral role in others. 
 Another contribution of the current research is the extension of the underlying 
principles of the linguistic category model into the realm of non-human targets. The LCM 
is based on the premise that describing the same event using language of differential 
specificity versus generality has implications for a message recipient’s judgments and 
perceptions. In keeping with this notion, the current studies demonstrated that simply 
presenting a pro-toothpaste message in concrete versus abstract terms gave rise to a great 
deal of variation in attitudes toward the target product. Clearly then, varying the 
abstractness of the language used in a persuasive communication has implications for 
subsequent evaluations of the target described.  
 Although the current studies demonstrated that subtle differences in the 
abstractness of a persuasive message do influence evaluation (as does the research 
surrounding the LCM), all previous work has employed the linguistic category model in 
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describing human targets and their behaviors. A particular challenge in developing 
materials for the present studies involved the designation of language as concrete versus 
abstract in reference to toothpaste. In creating versions of the Razzle-Dazzle arguments 
that differed in terms of abstractness, the intent was to be as true as possible to the LCM’s 
stringent categorizations. Steps were taken to ensure that abstract arguments contained 
general, broad descriptions comprised mainly of ADJ phrases (e.g., “RD Inc. is a charitable 
company”). As the original LCM holds ADJs to be the most abstract category, using 
adjectives in the abstract arguments seemed the cleanest way of holding to the tenets of the 
LCM. Likewise, concrete arguments contained specific, detailed descriptions and were 
comprised of mainly DAVs and IAVs (e.g., “RD Inc. donates money to charities”) in an 
effort to ensure the concreteness of these descriptions as per the LCM.  
 Despite these measures, it is likely that the type of language used in the current 
studies does not quite map onto the precepts of the original linguistic category model. As 
the target described in the present studies was an inanimate object, the process by which 
linguistic variation affects evaluations may differ from that outlined by the original LCM. 
The current research indicates that there may be differences in how language affects 
evaluations of living versus inanimate targets. As human and non-human objects differ 
markedly in myriad ways (e.g., complexity, presence of a self, intent, free will, etc.), it is 
likely that differential linguistic abstractness functions differently in each context. Whereas 
abstractness indicates the relative normality of a target’s action in the intergroup context 
(i.e., linguistic intergroup bias), this distinction seemed to serve as more of an indication of 
the object’s worth when the target of evaluation was toothpaste. Concrete statements, 
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which provided greater detail about Razzle-Dazzle, were more persuasive than more 
general, abstract descriptions. Given these differences in the function of linguistic variation 
in descriptions of human and non-human targets, it is likely that a model of linguistic 
variation, complementary to yet distinct from the original linguistic category model, best 
explains the role that abstractness plays in persuasive messages about inanimate objects. 
Future Directions 
 If linguistic abstractness does not serve the same function in describing people 
versus inanimate objects, it seems possible that language may not influence persuasion in 
the same way when the object of evaluation is less utilitarian and more status- or luxury-
oriented. The current study employed toothpaste, a product of little desirability beyond its 
utilitarian teeth-cleaning function. In describing such a product, concrete terms relaying 
specific characteristics and functions of Razzle-Dazzle – how it would do its job, 
essentially – were preferred to broader, less definitive messages. Future research could 
examine if, in evaluating an object of greater value or higher desirability beyond simple 
utility (e.g., iPod, computer, clothing, vehicles), people weight abstract and concrete 
descriptions differently. It is feasible that these more luxury-type items bring with them an 
extra emotional appeal (i.e., the promise of popularity, the association with higher status) 
that utilitarian products such as toothpaste lack. This additional component could lead to 
perceptions of abstract descriptions as more persuasive than concrete language. Abstract 
terms invite message recipients to “fill in the gaps,” to infer characteristics of the target 
object beyond what is specifically described. If, when encountering a luxury item, abstract 
language allows people to bring to mind the product’s status, desirability, or other positive 
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associations with success or popularity, it is possible that people will evaluate the item 
more favorably than those whose thoughts are limited to the specific details provided by 
concrete arguments. Such a pattern would indicate that abstract language may open the 
door for individuals to pull in past experiences, associations, and attitudes in evaluating 
objects with a more luxury/status function.  
 Building upon this work, future investigations could attempt to tie linguistic 
variation to more applied areas of attitude change and persuasion. A particularly interesting 
avenue of future work could investigate how differential linguistic abstractness functions 
in political messages. Throughout campaign ads, slogans, and speeches, a variety of 
arguments, both abstract and concrete, are advanced. Closer empirical examination could 
identify the conditions under which each type of language is viewed as more persuasive. 
Sweeping, general statements (e.g., “Change we can believe in”) may resonate very 
strongly for people who already view a candidate somewhat favorably. Given the power of 
abstractness to invite the message recipient to use information beyond the phrase itself to 
make evaluations and judgments, it seems that this type of language would be most 
effective for individuals who already possess a positive attitude toward the political 
candidate described. When confronted with the same broad statement, people who do not 
have pre-existing positive attitudes about the candidate may react as the participants in the 
current studies did: they may view the lack of specificity as troubling and unconvincing, 
leading them to evaluate the candidate less positively. Conversely, messages containing 
concrete language (e.g., “Candidate X donated $1,000 to a local charity”) may be 
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particularly persuasive for individuals who are relatively unfamiliar with the candidate 
who, essentially, have little else to go on in evaluating him or her.   
 In sum, the current studies extend the principles and research surrounding both the 
elaboration likelihood model and the linguistic category model. By directly manipulating 
linguistic abstractness and demonstrating its effect on attitudes about a hypothetical 
product, these studies represent a first step toward bridging the gap between two well-
established models. In so doing, the current studies enhance our understanding of the role 
language plays in changing attitudes and identify yet another factor at work in persuasive 
communication. 
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APPENDIX A: Arguments by Category 
 
Concrete Strong 
1.   Razzle-Dazzle tastes great. 
2.   RD, Inc. donates 25% of its profits from Razzle-Dazzle sales to charities. 
3.   Razzle-Dazzle contains all-natural ingredients. 
4. Razzle-Dazzle scored a “9 out of 10” in dentists’ evaluation of quality and 
effectiveness. 
5.   RD, Inc. makes Razzle-Dazzle tubes out of recycled materials. 
6.   Razzle-Dazzle freshens breath 6 hours longer than the leading competitor. 
7.   Razzle-Dazzle costs about $1 less than the leading competitor. 
8.   RD, Inc. sells Razzle-Dazzle in all major grocery stores. 
9.   Razzle-Dazzle whitens teeth 50% better than the leading competitor. 
10. Razzle-Dazzle reduces plaque by up to 45%. 
 
Abstract Strong 
1. Razzle-Dazzle has a great taste the whole family will love. 
2. RD, Inc. is a charitable company. 
3.   Razzle-Dazzle is an all-natural toothpaste. 
4.  Razzle-Dazzle is recommended by dentists. 
5.  RD, Inc. is an environmentally friendly company. 
6.  Razzle-Dazzle:  The best choice for fresh breath. 
7.  Razzle-Dazzle:  Available at a great low price. 
8.  Razzle-Dazzle is readily available in all major grocery stores. 
9.  Razzle-Dazzle:  For a brighter, whiter smile. 
10. Razzle-Dazzle is a great plaque fighter.   
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Concrete Weak 
1.   Razzle-Dazzle tastes alright. 
2.   RD, Inc. donates .05% of its profits from Razzle-Dazzle sales to charities. 
3. Razzle-Dazzle contains mainly natural ingredients. 
4.   Razzle-Dazzle scored a “9 out of 10” in RD, Inc.’s evaluation of quality and 
effectiveness. 
5.   RD, Inc. makes Razzle-Dazzle tubes partially out of recycled materials. 
6.   Razzle-Dazzle freshens breath 5 minutes longer than the leading competitor. 
7.   Razzle-Dazzle costs about $.10 less than the leading competitor. 
8.   RD, Inc. sells Razzle-Dazzle in select grocery stores only. 
9.   Razzle-Dazzle whitens teeth as well as the leading competitor. 
10. Razzle-Dazzle reduces plaque by up to 5%. 
 
Abstract Weak 
1.   Razzle-Dazzle has a bearable taste. 
2.   RD, Inc. is a somewhat charitable company. 
3.   Razzle-Dazzle is a mostly all-natural toothpaste. 
4.   Razzle-Dazzle is recommended by RD, Inc. 
5.   RD, Inc. is not an environmentally friendly company. 
6.   Razzle-Dazzle:  For relatively fresh breath. 
7.   Razzle-Dazzle:  Available at a decent price. 
8.   Razzle-Dazzle is available in select grocery stores only. 
9.   Razzle-Dazzle:  For a reasonably white smile. 
10. Razzle-Dazzle is a reasonably good plaque-fighter. 
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APPENDIX B: Attitudes Measure 
 
What do you think about Razzle-Dazzle?  Please rate Razzle-Dazzle on the following 
dimensions.   
 
Bad      -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Good 
 
Unfavorable        -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Favorable 
 
Negative     -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Positive 
 
Dislike      -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Like 
  
Against     -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 In Favor 
 
What do you think about the arguments presented for Razzle-Dazzle?  Please rate the 
arguments on the following dimensions. 
 
Weak      -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Strong 
 
Unconvincing     -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Convincing 
 
Specific     -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 General 
 
 
How likely would you be to try Razzle-Dazzle? 
 
Unlikely to try     -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Likely to try 
     
 
How likely would you be to buy Razzle-Dazzle? 
 
Unlikely to buy   -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Likely to buy 
     buy 
 
How likely would you be to recommend Razzle-Dazzle? 
 
Unlikely to     -4        -3        -2        -1        0        1        2        3        4 Likely to  
recommend         recommend 
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APPENDIX C: Need for Cognition Scale 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you. Please use the following scale: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 extremely somewhat uncertain somewhat extremely 
 uncharacteristic uncharacteristic  characteristic characteristic 
 
 1.   I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 2.   I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
 3.   Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
 4.   I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities. 
 5.   I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will 
have to think in depth about something. 
 6.   I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
 7.   I only think as hard as I have to. 
 8.   I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 
 9.   I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. 
 10.   The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
 11.   I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
 12.   Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. 
 13.   I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
 14.   The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
 15.   I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
 16.   I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot 
of mental effort.  
 17.   It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why 
it works. 
 18.   I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
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APPENDIX D: Importance of Dental Hygiene Questionnaire 
 
How important is dental hygiene to you? 
 
Not important  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Very important 
 
How often do you brush your teeth? 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
What brand of toothpaste do you normally use? 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you have a brand that you prefer?    Yes  No 
 
If so, which brand is it? 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
How often do you go to the dentist? 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX E: Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Gender (circle): Male  Female 
Age:    
Marital Status (check one):  
    Single   
    Married  
    Separated 
    Divorced  
    Widowed 
 
Ethnicity (check one):   
    White/Caucasian   
    Hispanic/Latino(a) 
    African-American/Black  
    Asian 
    Native American   
    Other – Please list:     
 
What is your religious affiliation (check one): 
 
    Christian – Protestant    Muslim 
    Christian – Catholic    Jewish 
    Hindu      Atheist 
    Buddhist      Agnostic 
    Not religious     Other – Please list:    
 
 
How would you characterize your hometown?  (check one) 
 
_____ rural (unincorporated) 
_____ small town (village or town) 
_____ suburban (metropolitan area of a large city) 
_____ small city (population < 30,000) 
_____ medium-sized city (population 30,000 – 100,000) 
_____ large city (population > 100,000) 
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APPENDIX F: Need for Affect Scale 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent you agree with the 
statement. Please use the following scale: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 strongly    strongly 
 disagree    agree 
 
1.  If I reflect on my past, I see that I tend to be afraid of feeling emotions. 
2.  I have trouble telling the people close to me that I love them. 
3.  I feel that I need to experience strong emotions regularly. 
4.  Emotions help people get along in life. 
5.  I am a very emotional person. 
6.  I think that it is important to explore my feelings. 
7.  I approach situations in which I expect to experience strong emotions. 
8.  I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try to avoid them. 
9.  I would prefer not to experience either the lows or highs of emotion. 
10.  I do not know how to handle my emotions, so I avoid them. 
11.  Emotions are dangerous – they tend to get me into situations that I would rather 
 avoid. 
12.  Acting on one’s emotions is always a mistake. 
13.  We should indulge our emotions. 
14.  Displays of emotion are embarrassing. 
15.  Strong emotions are generally beneficial. 
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16.  People can function most effectively when they are not experiencing strong 
 emotions. 
17.  The experience of emotions promotes human survival. 
18.  It is important for me to be in touch with my feelings. 
19.  It is important for me to know how others are feeling. 
20.  I like to dwell on my emotions. 
21.  I wish I could feel less emotion. 
22.       Avoiding emotional events helps me sleep better at night. 
23.  I am sometimes afraid of how I might act if I become too emotional. 
24.  I feel like I need a good cry every now and then. 
25.  I would love to be like “Mr. Spock,” who is totally logical and experiences little 
 emotion. 
26.  I like decorating my bedroom with a lot of pictures and posters of things 
 emotionally significant to me. 
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